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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Losses from floods caused by hurricanes have dramatically increased in recent
years (National Weather Service, 2011). For example, the monetary losses from
Hurricane Katrina were the highest recorded number in history. The southeastern U.S. is
highly exposed to flood risk by hurricanes, and a large portion of total flood insurance
policies are issued in these areas. For example, the population of Florida consists of only
6% of the total population in the U.S., but 40% of the total flood insurance policies are
issued in Florida (Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center, 2011).
Related factors, such as increased population in hazard-prone areas, increased property
values in these areas, insufficient preparation for floods, and increased frequency of
flooding allegedly stemming from climate change, all contribute to this trend. Due to the
fact that many people are not sufficiently prepared against floods, most of the burden of
supporting victims and recovery is transferred to the government after flooding occurs. In
1968, Congress introduced the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) as an
alternative to reduce government expenditure to encourage people to participate in
mitigation activities. However, NFIP was not as effective as expected, because many
people refused to purchase flood insurance.
In response many researchers investigated which factors influence the decision to
purchase flood insurance to suggest ideas to invigorate participation in the NFIP.
Empirical evidence consistently indicates that a household’s income and the price of
1

insurance affect the decision to buy flood insurance and insurance coverage. For
example, Brown and Hoyt (2000) found that higher income households are more likely to
purchase flood insurance and to have a greater amount of insurance coverage than lower
income households. Also, the price of insurance is negatively related to the decision to
buy insurance. Kriesel and Landry (2004) also found that the price of insurance has a
negative relationship on purchase decisions. In their study, they also showed that people
with higher incomes have a greater probability of purchasing insurance than people with
lower incomes. Landry and Jahan-Pavar (2010) found that households in a higher income
category hold greater flood insurance coverage than households in a lower income
category. Their study also confirmed the negative relationship between price and
purchasing insurance.
Additionally, it has been found that previous flood damage experience increases
the probability of purchasing flood insurance (Browne and Hoyt, 2000; Zahran et al.,
2009). The presence of a mortgage also increases the probability of purchasing (Browne
and Hoyt, 2000). Damage protection facilities such as seawalls have positive influence on
the insurance purchase decision, and the distance from an erosion reference feature such
as beach vegetation line is negatively related to flood insurance purchasing (Kriesel and
Landry, 2004). A premium deduction with respect to the CRS (Community Rating
System) participation also has an influence on the probability of a flood insurance
purchase (Zahran et al., 2009). NFIP subsidizes flood insurance premium when CRS
participating communities perform floodplain management activities. The floodplain
fraction of local community (Zahran et al., 2009) and flood zone affect the decision for a
flood insurance purchase (Landry and Jahan-Pavar, 2010). All these variables are related

2

to the risk of a damage causing events, and thus, the decision for purchasing flood
insurance is affected by risk factors.
The primary intention of policy holders to purchase insurance is to reduce and
potentially avoid unexpected losses. Thus, it seems helpful in understanding the policy
holders if we concentrate on risk factors of their decision-makings than other factors.
Kunreuther (1996) insisted that perceived risks have a greater impact than the actual risk
to which people are exposed. Kunreuther likewise stated that low probability disasters
such as floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes challenge people due to the lack of
information from accumulated data to estimate precise losses. In other words, the
uncertainty about risk exists in such low probability disasters. Burby (2001) indicated
that many people willingly hold other insurance for risks which have a lower probability
of occurring than flooding. For example, 95% of homeowners hold fire insurance which
has a 1% chance of causing damage, but the flood insurance purchase rate is around 20%
in spite of a 26% chance of damage in 100-year floodplain (Burby, 2001).
Other empirical results explain why the role of risk ambiguity needs to be better
understood regarding the decision to buy insurance. Two similar experiments of Hogarth
and Kunreuther in 1985 and 1989 confirmed that people are more willing to purchase
insurance at a higher price for a situation with greater ambiguity than for a nonambiguous situation. Kunreuther et al. (1995) found that an ambiguous probability of a
hazardous event leading to a vague estimation of losses results in higher insurance
premiums than a non-ambiguous probability situation. In summary, previous research
supports the claim that the decision to purchase flood insurance is related to one’s attitude
toward risk.
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Objectives
To help people in danger of flooding and to reduce losses from floods, a better
understanding of the determining factors of flood insurance purchasing is necessary to
provide an appropriate insurance package and to encourage people to purchase flood
insurance. In order to find the determining factors of flood insurance purchasing, we
primarily focus on the relationship between risk factors, especially risk ambiguity, and
the decision to purchase flood insurance.
Thus, the objectives of this thesis are to:
1

Construct a regression model to better understand factors affecting individuals’
perceived risk ambiguity related to flood risk.

2

Construct a regression model to better understand the role of risk preferences, risk
perceptions, and especially risk ambiguity, on the decision to purchase flood
insurance.
Definitions
This section provides definitions for key terms in this thesis. In Risk, Uncertainty

and Profit (1921), Frank Knight distinguishes risk--“measurable uncertainty”--from
uncertainty--“unmeasurable sense” (p. 20). Since Frank Knight’s distinction between
risk and uncertainty, alternative definitions that explain risk and uncertainty have care
about. Hardaker et al. (1997) state that “risk is imperfect knowledge where the
probabilities of the possible outcomes are known” and that “uncertainty exists when these
probabilities are not known” (p. 5). Etner et al. (2010) gives a similar distinction: risks
are “situations in which information is available, in the form of probability distributions,”
(p. 3) and uncertainty is the “situation in which the decision maker is not given
probabilistic information about the external events that might affect the outcome of a
4

decision” (p. 2). Arrow (1971) indicates that uncertainty arises when there is a certain
observed consequence, but an individual cannot explain the subjective probability of the
consequence because of the incomplete information.
Similar to uncertainty, ambiguity is also used among scholars who agree with
Knight’s distinction between risk and uncertainty. Ellsberg (1961) mentions ambiguity as
“a quality depending on the amount, type, reliability, and ‘unanimity’ of information
giving rise to one’s degree of ‘confidence’ in an estimate of relative likelihoods,” (p. 657)
and indicates that ambiguity exists when people do not know enough to be sure about the
probability distribution of an event. Cabantous (2006) defines ambiguity as “situations
where decision makers do not know the exact likelihoods of each potential event” (p.
219). Etner (2010) mentions that, in most literature, ambiguity and uncertainty are not
very distinguishable or are used interchangeable. However, we give some distinctions
between ambiguity and uncertainty, and thus ambiguity is a sub-concept of uncertainty in
this paper. The following definitions are provided for clear understanding of the terms
risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity, as used in this paper.


Certainty: This indicates the case in which an event it will occur with no risk,
i.e., P[X=x] = 1.



Uncertainty: Any case that is not included in the ‘certainty’ category.
Uncertainty is divided into two subcategories: risk and ambiguity.
o Risk: The case in which an event is known to occur with a fully
characterized probability distribution. In the case of a continuous
random variable, the distribution can be expressed explicitly; for
example, a normal distribution is X~N (0, 1). For a discrete random

5

variable case, one can identify a particular probability, such as P[X=1]
= 0.1.
o Ambiguity: The case in which an event is known to occur with less
than fully characterized probability distribution. Unlike risk, under
ambiguity one cannot explicitly express the distribution for a
continuous random variable completely even though they have some
information such as mean, variance or both. The discrete random
variable case has a similar problem. One can give only a range of
probability instead of a certain point of probability, e.g., 0.1 < P[X=1]
< 0.2.


Risk Perception: The subjective probability held by an individual’s for a
certain event. In this paper, through questions about the magnitude of damage
from major hurricanes and frequency of the hurricane damage occurrences
three points of risk perception were measured (the highest, the lowest, and
mean values of perceived risk).



Risk preference: An individual’s attitude toward risk expressed as risk loving,
risk neutral, or risk averse. According to Nicholson and Snyder (2008), risk
aversion means an individual “who always refuses fair bets” and “exhibit[s] a
diminishing marginal utility of wealth.” A risk loving individual acts the
opposite to a risk averse individual, and a risk neutral person does not have a
preference for accepting or refusing the fair game, and always has a linear
expected utility function with a constant marginal utility.

6

There are some flood insurance related terms:


Community Rating System (CRS): Through the voluntary participation in
flood protection activities, each community can get incentive from the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). CRS consists of ten classes, and
depend on the degree of participation in protective activities, each community
is provided a reduced insurance premium rate. Class 1 is the most active
participation level with the highest premium reduction.



Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM): This is official map identifying the flood
hazard areas by FEMA to provide regional flood risk information. According
to probabilities of flooding, areas are classified as different flood zones which
indicate the levels of flood risk.



Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA): According to the NFIP’s map, SFHA is
highly flood risk exposed areas.

This thesis is comprised of six chapters. Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction of
the research, the objectives, and a few key definitions. Chapter 2 provides background
information about flood damage trends and the NFIP. Chapter 3 is a review of literature
and theories about risk factors and set the general perceived risk model. Chapter 4
explores the factors that affect the NFIP participation. Based on previous literature, the
econometric model to examine these factors is defined. Chapter 5 describes the collected
data via online survey. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the method of estimating influential
factors on one’s perceived risk and the decision-making for NFIP participation. Also the
empirical results are reported. Finally, in Chapter 7, it is discussed significant findings of
this study and suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER II
GENERAL INFORMATION OF FLOOD AND FLOOD INSURANCE
Flood Damage
Natural disasters are characterized low probability and high magnitude events; in
other words, they do not occur frequently, but once they happen, the magnitude of
damage is severe and catastrophic. The Insurance Information Institution (2011) defines a
catastrophe as an event “when claims are expected to reach a certain dollar threshold,
currently set at $2 million, and more than a certain number of policyholders and
insurance companies are affected.” Flooding is a typical example of a catastrophic
natural disaster.
There are two reasons for focusing on floods: huge losses from floods and
increased population in coastal areas. According to a trend in the data of losses from
floods, flood damage has increased dramatically in recent decades. The National Weather
Service (2011) provides the only observable data which cover all states regarding
flooding. Figure 1 shows the total amount of flood losses in actual dollar amounts for the
years from 1903 to 2007. As Figure 1 shows, the amount of losses from floods is growing
in the U.S.; thus, the losses from floods are getting harder to more costly to the
government than before.
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Figure 1

Losses from Flood Damage In the U.S. (National Weather Service, 2011)

One of the main causes of flooding is hurricanes. Swiss Re (2011) reports that the
40 most costly insurance losses in the world, including both natural disasters and manmade disasters, occurred between 1970 and 2009. Table 1 shows the first 10 records of
the 40 most costly insured losses. Among the listed events, 9 events occurred in the U.S,
and seven events stem from hurricanes. The Insurance Information Institution (2011)
reports that the most frequent catastrophic loss events in the U.S. are hurricanes and
tropical storms accounting for 45.2% of the total events, and the second most frequent
event is tornados, 29%. As a result, coastal areas are exposed to very high potential losses
caused by hurricanes.

9

Table 1
Year
2005
1992
2001
1994
2008
2004
2005
2005
2004
1991

The 10 most Costly Insurance Losses between 1970 and 2009 (Swiss Re,
2011)

Losses(Million USD)
71,163
24,479
22,767
20,276
19,940
14,642
13,807
11,089
9,148
8,899

Event
Hurricane Katrina
Hurricane Andrew
Terror attack on WTC
Northridge earthquake
Hurricane Ike
Hurricane Ivan
Hurricane Wilma
Hurricane Rita
Hurricane Charley
Typhoon Mireille

Location
US, Gulf of Mexico, Bahamas
US, Bahamas
US
US
US, Gulf of Mexico et al
US, Barbados et al
US, Mexico, Jamaica, Haiti et al
US, Gulf of Mexico, Cuba
US, Cuba, Jamaica et al
Japan

Figure 2 shows the population change in percentages between 2000 and 2010
(Census Bureau, 2011). The dark green colored portion indicates a 50% or more
increased population, and the dark purple shows decreased population. This figure
indicates that many counties located in coastal areas experienced a greater increase of
their population than non-coastal counties. The Insurance Information Institution (2011)
also analyzes the data of the Census Bureau and indicates that currently, 34.9 million
people are exposed to the hazards of Atlantic Hurricanes. This is three times increased
number from the 1950’s population of 10.2 million.
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Figure 2

Population Change in County from 2000 to 2010 (U.S. Census Bureau,
2011)
Failure of Private Insurance Companies

Prior to NFIP, private insurance companies provided insurance for flood damage.
However, the trials failed to establish enough demand for keeping the operation of these
insurance companies. Private insurance companies had abandoned because the high
premium rates required by firms were generally higher than what consumers were willing
to pay. Skees and Barnett (1999) explained the conditions for an insurable risk by citing
Rejda’s (1995) expressions: a large number of exposure units, accidental and
unintentional loss, determinable and measurable loss, and an economically feasible
premium. Floods violate these conditions. Browne and Hoyt (2000) explained reasons of
this private insurance market failure using the Studies of Floods and Flood Damage,
1952-1955. They listed the reasons of failure as follows: flood results in catastrophic
losses, some areas have obvious probability of loss, the amount of the premium exceeds
11

the consumers’ willingness to pay, and various levels of loss probabilities for insurers do
not exist. Consequently, the failure of private flood insurance stems from the flood risk
characteristics that are not insurable. Due to the characteristics of natural disasters, it is
obvious that the losses from a flood are more widespread than other risks such as car
accidents or house fires, and once a flood happens, the amount of losses is large and
consequently leads high premium rates. Moreover, such areas as shorelines and river
banks clearly endure a higher risk than other places located far away from the coasts or
rivers. All these situations limit the ability of insurance companies to control correlated
natural disaster losses. Insurance companies make a profit by taking a premium as
compensation for bearing risk instead of the policy holders. Insurance companies use risk
aggregation, risk segregation, or both to reduce risk. As already mentioned, unlike
automobile insurance, once flooding occurs, flood damage appears in a series and covers
broad areas. In other words, insurance companies have to compensate a large number of
policy holders at the same time and have to spread their risk to decrease the huge burden
of compensation to insurance policy holders. However, the correlation among the
insurance policy holders makes risk-spreading difficult. Therefore, the characteristics of
natural disasters and systematic risk problems make it hard for small scale private
insurance companies to effectively support the recovery from catastrophic disasters
within their abilities. Due to the failure of the private insurance market, the National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was introduced by the government to mitigate both
flood risk and losses of coastal and fluvial area residents.

12

Introduction of NFIP
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was introduced by the National
Flood Insurance Act of 1968 as an alternative way to control increasing expenses for
post-flood disaster aid. The three primary goals of the NFIP are indemnifying losses
through the flood insurance program, mitigating future damage through flood plain
management of participating states and communities, and reducing expenditures for
disaster relief and damage control. This program is the first governmental program that
encourages chronic or potential flood victims interact with the government voluntary.
The NFIP not only tries to reduce the after-disaster relief expenses through insurance but
also tries to prevent flood damage by conducting flood protection activities at the
individual and community levels. As an incentive for flood protection performance, the
NFIP offers discounted rates on insurance premiums to participating communities with
respect to their protective implementation levels (FEMA, 2010). Unfortunately, only
10.5% of the total flood-bearing communities participated in the NFIP by 1973 (Tobin
and Calfee, 2005).
Congress found that the participation rate was much lower than its original
expectations, and more effective methods were requested to encourage the participation
of people in peril of flood. As a result, the mandatory purchase of flood insurance was
enforced to increase the number of insurance policy holders through the Flood Disaster
Protection Act of 1973. This new act required that mortgaged homeowners whose
properties are located in a SFHA (Special Flood Hazard Area) purchase flood insurance
if their mortgages were borrowed from regulated agencies such as the FRB (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System). It was also required that when these
homeowners buy flood insurance, their coverage needs to be at least equal to the
13

outstanding mortgage principal or the maximum coverage level. In addition to the
mandatory purchase, Congress prohibited regulated lenders from making, increasing,
extending, or renewing loans backed by properties located in a SFHA even though the
properties were covered by flood insurance. In response to the mandatory requirement of
flood insurance, the number of policy holders and participating communities increased
significantly. FEMA reported that the number of policy holders increased to 1,200,000 in
1977 compared to 95,000 in 1973, and 71% of the total flood-prone communities
participated in the NFIP.
In 1994, Congress again amended the NFIP to complement the Flood Disaster
Protection Act. The National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 enhanced the
previous regulation by extending the number of institutions requiring flood insurance to
mortgage borrowers. Moreover, the mortgage purchases of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
from the secondary market also became a subject of the mandatory purchase requirement.
At this point, the NFIP provided greater coverage levels than before. For example,
insurers can be covered up to $250,000 for single-family and multifamily homes
compared to $35,000 for a single family residence under the 1973 act. As a result, the
number of policies in force has increased almost fourfold, from 1,446,354 in 1978 to
5,646,735 in 2010 (FEMA, 2011). Figure 3 shows the number of policies in force from
1978 to 2010.
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Figure 3

Number of NFIP Policies in Force from 1978 to 2010 (FEMA, 2011)

In spite of continued government intervention, many people at risk of flooding
still remain uninsured (Burby, 2001). According to the report of Pricewaterhouse
Coopers (1999), the NFIP participation rate of all SFHA structures in 1997 was 28%. The
other report in 2006 reported the participation rate of single family house (SFH) in a
SFHA is 49% (Dixon et al., 2006). The market penetration had improved, but a half of
SFH in a SFHA are still not secured by insurance. Kunreuther (2006) gives five main
reasons why people fail to undertake risk mitigation actions such as buying flood
insurance. First, they have a tendency to underestimate or to ignore risk probabilities
when they face a low probability event; second, people make decisions based on shortrun mitigation benefits only; third, the fixed amount of income limits the ability to take
mitigating actions; fourth, people tend to imitate their neighbor’s behavior; and fifth,
people expect government aid after disasters.

15

CHAPTER III
RISK AND AMBIGUITY
Risk Perception
When people are confronted with risk, two different risks exist: actual risk and
perceived risk. Because of difference between these two risks, the expectation for
people’s behaviors was not match with the actual behaviors. Previous research observed
an individual’s perceived risk. Kunreuther (1976) found that uninsured people perceive
their risk probabilities relatively low than insured people. Moreover, when he compared
the expected damage on properties from a severe flood, more uninsured people expect no
damage on their properties than insured people.
Miceli, Sotgiu, and Settanmi (2008) explored that an individual’s adoption of
protective behavior related to hydrogeological risk. They found that protective adoption
is significantly related to flood risk perception, participation in Civil Defense activities,
age, and closeness to water courses.
Lachlan et al. (2009) focused on the relationship between race and perceived risk.
They confirmed that, depending on the race of a person, he would perceive his risk
differently, and the perceived risk affect the person’s reaction for risk prevention
activities. In their research, African-Americans show the lowest level of risk perception
and the lowest level of risk preventing actions.
Burrus et al. (2008) observed the influence of several factors on an individual’s
risk mitigation level. They observed the impact of subjective hurricane risk perception on
16

a home owner’s mitigation activities. This study did not focus on insurance, but on
mitigation activities. Burrus et al. found that income, deductible, and education level are
positively related to risk mitigation. They also noted that low mitigation does not stems
from underestimation of probability, but the underestimation of damage level.
Kellens et al. (2011) studied about perceived flood risk and various factors and
found that level of risk perception is varied by risk levels of locations. High-risk location
residents showed higher risk perception than low-risk location residents. Moreover, they
observed that elder people and women have higher risk perception on average.
In sum, one’s perceived risk positively related to one’s risk resistant reaction such
as risk mitigation, protection against risk. Also there are significant findings about the
influence of demographic characteristics on one’s perceived risk.
Risk Ambiguity
People are confronted with various risks when they make decisions. All else
equal, if a person is risk-averse, he has a higher willingness to purchase insurance to
avoid a potential risk than a risk-loving person. Similarly, when people expect their risks
are severe, they are more willing to purchase insurance to protect themselves from losses.
In 1738, Bernoulli spoke that some behaviors under risky situations cannot be fully
explained by such existing theories as expected value. Bernoulli, therefore, suggested a
new concept, Expected Utility Theory. Later, the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms
clarified how rational behaviors are defined under the Expected Utility Theory. Since the
introduction of the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms, the Expected Utility Theory
seemed to accurately explain an individual’s decision-making mechanism in risky
situations.
17

However, Ellsberg (1961) found that people violate the von NeumannMorgenstern axioms when they experience ambiguity of perceived risk. Ellsberg
suggested a hypothetical urn experiment which observes an individual’s preference
between known probability and unknown probability. There were two different urns and
each urn had two different colored balls. The number of each ball is known in one urn,
and in the other urn, the distribution of the two balls is unknown. According to the von
Neumann-Morgenstern axioms, an individual’s preference for the same-colored ball is
not different regardless of the urns if the pay-off from the same-colored ball is the same.
In other words, the distribution of balls does not affect the personal preference as long as
a pay-off is the same. However, Ellsberg insisted that the majority of people will chose
the urn with a known distribution. Through similar examples, he explained that the real
choices under ambiguity are different with the prediction of the Expected Utility Theory.
Ellsberg explained that under ambiguous probability people have a hard time to calculate
their expected returns or to expect the consequence of a choice, and as a result, people
show ‘irrational’ behaviors violating the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. Ellsberg’s
experiment started the discussion about the impact of risk ambiguity on decision-making.
While Ellsberg explained that ambiguity is a matter of confidence in the estimated
probability, Becker and Brownson (1964) suggested that ambiguity is related to the
distributions of probability of an event. They assumed a person has ambiguity if the
person has a probability distribution rather than a point probability. Therefore, in their
experiment ambiguity is the range of distribution and the difference in ambiguity is the
absolute difference in ranges. They found that people are willing to pay to avoid an
ambiguous selection when the selection has the same expected value with unambiguous
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selection, and that as ambiguity increases, the willingness to pay to avoid ambiguity
increases.
Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) conducted an Ellsberg-like urn experiment to
observe the role of ambiguity in decision-making. They found that first, people are averse
to ambiguity. Second, people accept a higher insurance premium under ambiguity, and
finally, people will more willingness to pay for a low probability of loss than a high
probability of loss.
Hogarth and Kunreuther (1989) conducted an empirical experiment with subjects
knowledgeable about insurance to test the influence of ambiguity on deciding the level of
an insurance premium. They observed differences between consumers’ willingness to pay
for insurance premiums and the difference between firms’ willingness to accept insurance
premiums under ambiguous probability and non-ambiguous probability. In the
ambiguous probability case, the subjects were provided with conflicting information
about the probability, and in the non-ambiguous probability case, the subjects were
provide with confirmed, uniform comments about the probability. According to expected
utility theory, an insurance premium is not affected by the probabilistic ambiguity of an
event, if its expected loss is known. Respondents were asked their maximum (for
consumers) or minimum (for firms) insurance premium under a given probability of loss.
Both the ambiguous and the non-ambiguous versions of the experiment present the same
probability of loss, but for the ambiguity version the probability explained with lack of
confidence. For both consumers and firms, mean ratios of ambiguous to non-ambiguous
prices were larger in a lower probability of loss, e.g. p=0.1 than a higher probability of
loss, e.g. p=0.9. A mean ratio larger than one indicates that the subjects estimated a
higher insurance premium for an ambiguous case rather than for a non-ambiguous case.
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That is, people are ambiguity-averse. Although ambiguity aversion decreases as the
probability of loss increases in both consumer and firm cases, only consumers show an
ambiguity preference in the highest probability of loss (p=0.9).
Lauriola and Levin (2001) investigated a subject’s attitude toward ambiguity and
risk-taking utilizing an Ellsberg-like urn experiment. They agreed that ambiguity plays a
significant role in decision-making and wanted to find the relationship between an
individual’s ambiguity attitude and his real performance. Their empirical results showed
that the responses against ambiguity are positively related to the risk-taking attitude of a
person. In other words, a person who has a favorable attitude toward ambiguity also
shows a positive attitude toward risk-taking. Furthermore, the relationship of an
ambiguous attitude and risk-taking attitude is stronger in avoiding losses rather than in
achieving gains and is also stronger at a higher probability level than a lower probability
level.
Riddel (2009) insisted that the degree of exposure to knowledge involving risk
will affect an individual’s precise estimation of risk. On the contrary to the general
assumption that people estimate risk better with more information than with less
information, people who are highly exposed to information tend to experience more
ambiguity than people who are less exposed to risk information. She explained that
people could be more aware of the inherent ambiguity with more information, and there
could be a conflict of information from various sources.
Many researchers proved that there is a significant impact of risk ambiguity on
the insurance premium level and on an individual’s decision-making process to purchase
insurance. However, no significant research exists to observe the influence of risk
ambiguity on flood insurance purchasing directly. This chapter focuses on quantifying
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risk ambiguity and testing various factors that will decide an individual’s risk ambiguity
in order to eventually observe the influence of risk ambiguity on one’s flood insurance
purchasing. Since risk ambiguity is derived from perceived risk, our hypotheses and
conceptual frame for the perceived risk model includes risk ambiguity model
Conceptual Framework
Riddel (2009) and Nguyen et al. (2010) measured perceived mortality risk and
observed what kind of determinants has an impact on subjective risk. They utilized a risk
ladder as a method to elicit the subjective risk of respondents. The risk ladder gives visual
aid to respondents by showing reference positions of probabilities; for example, there is a
rung pointing to exactly 275 deaths caused by falling accidents per 100,000 and a rung of
75 deaths caused by fire accidents per 100,000. People are asked to present their expected
probabilities of mortality risk. Respondents can select a certain location on the risk ladder
to show their probabilistic perceptions. If a person points to one position, it means the
person is sure about the probability of a risk (no ambiguity). Otherwise, the person would
have risk ambiguity. Cameron (2005) elicited subjective risks about the climate change
issue. When the researcher observed the relationship between subjective risk and external
information ambiguity, she measured ambiguity as the range of the highest and lowest
guess for the temperature expectation in future. In sum, the range of perceived risk is one
of measurements of an individual’s risk ambiguity.
Based on previous examples, measuring risk ambiguity by the range of two
different points, we also interpret the difference between the highest and the lowest levels
of perceived flood risk as an individual’s risk ambiguity. When a respondent gives the
same values of the highest and the lowest levels of perceived risk, it means the person has
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no risk ambiguity. However, we do not know if this measurement is the best method for
eliciting an individual’s flood risk ambiguity, so we decide to use triangular variance
additionally. The comparison of difference risk ambiguity measurement methods is
conducted in order to examine a better method for measuring flood risk ambiguity.
Since risk ambiguity is derived from risk perception, it is assumed that risk
ambiguity and risk perception have the same function. Therefore, the following linear
function is general model of risk perception. The determinants for perceived flood risk
assumed to consist of one’s demographic characteristics, geographic characteristics, and
attitude toward risk. Therefore, risk perception is a function of dj, gj, rj, and  j , where dj
is a vector of demographic information variables, gj is a vector of geographic
characteristic variables, rj is a vector of risk attitude variables, and  j is an error term.
We assume that the risk perception function is a linear function. Therefore, the function
can be written
Y j  α d j  βg j  γ r j   j

(1)

where Y j is a risk perception variable measured by mean, range, and variance, and

α, β, and γ are vectors of coefficients.
Hypotheses
In this thesis, risk ambiguity is range and variance of risk perception. Therefore
perceived risk model is hypothesized based on relevant knowledge and previous literature
related to both risk perception and risk ambiguity. Nguyen et al. (2010) found that age is
negatively related to risk ambiguity. Riddel (2009) explained that the information on a
potential risk affects an individual’s risk ambiguity, but demographic variables do not
show a significant influence on risk ambiguity. Kellens et al. (2011) tested various factors
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affecting perceived flood risk. He hypothesized the impact of a location with different
risk levels, demographic factors (gender, age, education, home ownership, presence of
children), residence characteristics (having a cellar, residing on the ground floor,
visibility of the sea), previous flood experience, and permanent residency. Through three
models, he found that a location with different risk levels, age, and gender are
consistently significant. For example, a person has a higher risk perception when a person
resides in a higher risk location. Older people have higher perceived risk, and females
also have a higher risk perception. He expected permanent residents and tourists to show
a different risk perception; the risk perception of tourists did not change due to the risk
level of the location in which they are residing because they are temporary residents.
However, tourists staying in a high risk area did show a higher risk perception.
It is hypothesized that mean, range, and variance of perceived risk is explained by
an individual’s demographic characteristics (age, gender, income, education, marital
status, working status, and ethnicity), geographic characteristics (state, distance from the
coast, flood zone, and metro), and the attitude toward a risk (risk aversion, previous
damage). Table 2 presents details of variables and their expected signs.
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Table 2

Expectation of Explanatory Variables for Perceived Risk Model

Variable

Description

Risk Aversion

A risk-averse person may have larger perceived risk than a
risk-loving person.
Previous DamageA person who had previous flood damage experience may
have more perceived risk (Kellens et al. 2011).
Distance from As the distance from the coast increases, one’s perceived
the Coast
risk may decrease because one may feel that they are not as
susceptible to flood risk (Kellens et al. 2011).
Flood zone
If a person lives in a high flood risk area, he may feel larger
risk perception (Kellens et al. (2011).
State
A resident in Florida would have more perceived risk
because Florida is highly exposed to hurricane strikes.
Ethnicity
The risk perception of a person who is classified as
Caucasian differs from people of other races, but the
amount of different is unknown.
Working Status Whether a person works or not would affect risk
perception, but the exact influence is not clear.
Marital Status
A person with a spouse or a cohabitant probably has less
risk perception because the other person is also a source of
information.
Metro
A person who lives in a metropolitan area probably has less
perceived risk because it is expected that metropolitan areas
are well prepared against flood damage.
Age
An elder person has less risk perception (Nguyen et al.,
2010l; Kellens et al. 2011).
Gender
Being female would probably cause someone to experience
more risk perception (Riddel, 2009; Kellens et al. 2011).
Income
Income would affect one’s risk perception, but the exact
influence is not clear.
Education
With a high educational level, one’s risk perception may
decrease (Riddel, 2009).
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Expected
Sign
+
+
+
+/+/+
+/-

CHAPTER IV
DECISION MODEL FOR NFIP PARTICIPATION DECISION
Determinants for Flood Insurance Purchasing
Regarding insurance, Hogarth and Kunreuther (1989) and Kunreuther et al (1995)
stated that people have more of a willingness to pay for insurance premiums under
ambiguity. Kunreuther (1976) carried out a survey to understand individuals’ decision
making for insurance against a severe damage-expected event such as flooding or an
earthquake. He compared the expected damage on their properties and the subjective
probability of an event occurrence of insured people and uninsured people once a
catastrophic event occurs. Uninsured people expected no damage or minor damage on
their property if there was a severe flood or an earthquake. Moreover, the uninsured
group’s subjective probability about the occurrence was also lower than the insured
group’s one.
Browne and Hoyt (2000) estimated a flood insurance purchase model over 50
states using various sources of data such as the NFIP, the U.S Army Crop of Engineers.
Data from 1983 to 1993 was analyzed to estimate the model under the same condition of
the NFIP structure. They address that a property owner with a higher income has a
greater probability of purchasing insurance, and his insurance covers a greater amount
than a lower income property owner. The price of flood insurance is also negatively
related with a flood insurance purchase. These results suggest that the monetary
conditions of a potential policy holder are an important criterion affecting the decision25

making in purchasing flood insurance. Preceding flood damage experience has a
significantly positive relation with flood insurance purchase. Contrary to expectations,
the presence of FHA backed mortgage and insurance purchases are negatively related.
Kriesel and Landry (2004) provided an empirical analysis about an individual’s
decision for NFIP participation. In their empirical model, predicted insurance prices are
utilized instead of actual prices because it is impossible to get the insurance price of
uninsured people. The predicted price was induced by regressing seven factors which
FEMA uses for rate setting. The researchers found that the predicted price was negatively
related to NFIP participation. The results also suggested that the mortgaged properties’
owners have a 73% greater probability of participation on NFIP and that the respondents
who have a higher income have a greater probability of participation. The distance from
the erosion reference features which researchers assumed as a sign of self-insurance had a
negative effect on NFIP participation. As the hurricane interval is longer, the probability
of participation decreases because this interval represents the risk probability which
people are facing. The relationship between NFIP participation and an artificial
protection such as seawall, groin, or nourished beach protection was particularly
interesting. Kriesel and Landry expected that an artificial protection would be a sign for
a protective area or a risk involved area. Their finding seems to suggest that an artificial
protection is a sign of risk because more households located near an artificial protection
participated in the NFIP.
Zahran et al. (2009) explored the number of policy holders in the CRS
participating counties in Florida to estimate the effect of the CRS on flood insurance
purchasing. They used county-level data in Florida because communities in Florida are
largely participating in the CRS and also suffering from severe flood damage. They
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explained that among the CRS participating communities high insurance-purchase rate
communities tend to be located in coastal areas, and an enthusiastic CRS participating
county, which has a high CRS score, has a high insurance purchase rate. Two
demographic variables, median home value, and education level, are positively correlated
to insurance purchase rates. Zahran et al. defined a fraction of floodplain in local lands
and a previous experience of flood damage as the hazard proximity condition which
shows an individual’s risk perception. The higher the fraction of floodplain in a local land
is, the higher insurance purchase rates become. Moreover, the previous flood experience
results in increased insurance purchasing rates.
Landry and Jahan -Pavar (2010) observed the influential variables on a flood
insurance coverage choice using community level-data. They focused on the near-shore
areas from different states located on east-south coasts. They found that insurance price is
negatively related to coverage demand, that subsidized premium holders have a greater
insurance coverage level, that a higher insurance coverage level is in the V-zone (highrisk zone) compared to low-risk zones, and that erosion hazard increases the coverage
level. Interestingly, flood insurance holdings in areas with coastal management by beach
replenishment are greater while flood insurance holdings in areas with coastal armoring
are lower. Both actions are a part of coastal defense in a large scope, but reactions against
these two are different. The researchers also found that mortgages induce more insurance
coverage and that retired people have lower insurance coverage. However, these two
factors are not statistically significant. Initially, they could not find the significance of
income variables. After transforming income variables into a categorical form, it can
easily be revealed that the higher income category has more insurance coverage.
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Michel-Kerjan and Kousky (2010) analyzed the characteristics of flood insurance
policy holders in Florida based on NFIP data between 2000 and 2005. Policy holders in
Florida are mostly single family residents and live in 100-year flood plains areas. About
75% of total policyholders have not buy the maximum coverage of flood insurance, and
80% of total policyholders choose the lowest level of deductible. It seems that most
policyholders in Florida want to reduce their premiums and their damage expenses at the
same time. However, policyholders in a higher risk area tend to increase their deductible
amount relative to people in low-risk areas. It may be because of expensive prices of
premiums. Half of policy holders reside in communities with 7 or 8 of CRS classes
where their premium discount rates are 15% and 10% respectively. Interestingly, 62% of
policies are dropped in 5 years, so the sustaining rate is very low.
Conceptual Framework
Since Smith (1968) and Mossin (1968) utilized the expected utility function to
estimate the optimal insurance coverage level, Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s
Expected Utility Theory has been utilized to explain the decision-making for insurance
purchasing, typically. In other words, the decision-making for insurance purchasing could
be explained through an individual’s expected utility function. However, as Ellsberg’s
paradox indicated, empirical evidences for human behaviors did not match with the
predictions of the expected utility theory, especially, in risk ambiguity cases. For
example, people did not purchase insurance even though their expected utility of
insurance purchasing exceeds the expected utility of not purchasing insurance.
Kunreuther’s (1976) field study reported that the behavior of flood or earthquakesusceptible residents is not consistent with expected utility theory. He surveyed residents
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in flood or earthquake risk areas including both insured and uninsured people. When he
calculated the contingency price ratio, i.e., the ratio of the expected cost of insurance, to
observe decision making regarding an individual’s risk preference, he found many riskaverse people (39%) are not insured, while many risk-loving people (39%) are insured,
which means they did not follow the expected behavior according to the expected utility
model. In his analysis of the survey results, Kunreuther explained that the reason why
people did not follow the predicted behavior for maximizing utility was because people
did not have the ability to process the probabilistic problem using their limited
information. Etner (2010) also insisted that the expected utility model is a leading model
under risk, but the model is challenged for ambiguous cases. Flooding is a typical
example of natural disasters which have a low probability of occurring, but a high
magnitude of damage. Although the possibility of flood’s occurrence is significantly low,
the damage is catastrophic once it happens. The decision-making process for flood
insurance purchases is closely related to understanding the probability of the event.
Therefore, in this study, instead of using the Expected Utility model, the demand
is estimated based on the Random Utility theory developed by McFadden (1973).
Hanemann (1984) developed this Random Utility model for discrete responses using the
McFadden’s random utility framework. The choice for flood insurance purchasing is a
dichotomous choice, and thus there are only two choices: ‘yes,’ purchasing insurance or
‘no,’ not purchasing insurance. Therefore, the utility function of a jth household under
choice i is
ui , j  ui (g j , p j , r j , d j ,  i , j ),

where i=0, the utility function expresses the utility for the uninsured household.
Otherwise, when i=1, the utility function indicates the insured person’s utility. gj is a
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(2)

vector of geographic characteristics; pj is a vector of flood insurance policy variables; rj
is a vector of an individual’s attitude toward a risk; dj is a vector of a household’s
demographic characteristics; and  i,j is an error term which is not explicitly observable.
Generally, the price of insurance is called premium, and previous research confirmed that
premium is significantly related to one’s decision for insurance purchase. However, the
price of insurance is not included explicitly in this model. According to Petrolia, Landry,
and Coble (2011), the price of flood insurance varies according to observable risk factors
of FEMA which are related in determining insurance rates. Therefore, the price of
insurance is affected by the amount of exposed risk and additionally one’s decision for
coverage level. Both exposed risk and coverage level vary by individuals, and thus
observable risk factors that can affect the price of insurance such flood zone, CRS, and
preFIRM are include in the models instead of insurance premium. If an individual’s
utility of purchasing insurance exceeds the utility of an uninsured status, the person will
willingly purchase flood insurance. An individual is assumed to purchase insurance if:
u1, j (g j , p j , r j , d j , 1, j ;1)  u0, j (g j , p j , r j , d j ,  0, j ; 0)

(3)

The probability of jth household’s purchasing insurance is thus:
Pr(i  1)  P[u1, j (g j , p j , r j , d j , 1, j )  u0, j (g j , p j , r j , d j ,  0, j )]

(4)

Otherwise, a person does not purchase flood insurance.
Using the general probability statement, we need to construct an econometric
model for parameter estimation. It is assumed that the utility function of the decision
makers is linear in parameters. The linear utility function of jth household is written
ui, j  βi,1g j  βi,2p j  β i,3r j  β i,4d j   i, j
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(5)

where βi,1 through βi,4 are vectors for parameter estimation for jth household’s
explanatory variable vectors, g, p, r, and d respectively. The jth household’s linear
utility function with flood insurance (i=1) would be

u1, j  β1,1g j  β1,2p j  β1,3r j  β1,4d j  1, j ,

(6)

and utility function without insurance (i=0) would be

u0, j  β0,1g j  β0,2p j  β0,3r j  β0,4d j   0, j .

(7)

An individual purchases flood insurance when the utility with flood insurance exceeds
the utility with no insurance. It can be written as
u1, j  β1,1g j  β1,2p j  β1,3r j  β1,4d j   1, j
 β 0,1g j  β 0,2p j  β 0,3r j  β 0,4d j   0, j  u0, j .

(8)

The difference between random components, in here error terms, cannot be identified, so
it could be written as a single term,  j  1, j   0, j . Moreover, the estimate parameter only
estimates the difference between vectors; it does not estimates each vector separately, so
we can rewrite this difference as βt  β1,t  β0,t . By rearranging the difference between
the utility of insurance purchasing and non-purchasing is

u1, j  u0, j  (β1,1  β0,1 )g j  (β1,2  β0,2 )p j  (β1,3  β0,3 )r j  (β1,4  β0,4 )d j   j
 β1g j  β 2p j  β3r j  β 4d j   j ,

9)

Therefore, the probability statement for a decision maker of insurance purchase (i=1) is

Pr1  P(β1g j  β2p j  β3r j  β4d j   j  0).

(10)

To estimate the parameters of the utility function, it is required to specify the random
components. In most cases, random component  j , is assumed independently and
identically distributed (IID) with a zero mean. When the error term is IID and has a mean
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of zero, the normal distribution and logistic distribution are commonly used. This
probability of jth household responding ‘yes’ can be estimated as
P(β1g j  β 2p j  β 3r j  β 4d j   j  0)
 P[(β1g j  β 2p j  β3r j  β 4d j )   j ]

(11)

 1  P[(β1g j  β 2p j  β 3r j  β 4d j )   j ]

Because the probability distribution is symmetric, it is true that F(x) = 1 - F(-x), and thus,
the probability of ‘yes’ for a jth household can be rewritten
P( j  β1g j  β 2p j  β 3r j  β 4d j ).

(12)

Hypotheses
Previous literature provides a background for setting the hypotheses of this
research paper. However, some variables we consider in this paper are not found in
previous literature. Those variables are hypothesized based on our intuition. The
following factors are hypothesized as having an influence on deciding flood insurance
purchasing.
Table 3

Expectation for Explanatory Variables for NFIP Participation Model

Variable
Range/ Variance
Risk Aversion
Risk Perception

Mortgage Status

Description

When range/Variance of perceived risk increases, the
probability of flood insurance purchasing would decreases.
The probability of purchasing flood insurance increases with a
higher degree of a risk aversion attitude (Baumann and Sims,
1978; Kunreuther, 1996).

Risk perception is measured through three scenarios:
hurricane frequency, magnitude of damage, expected
damage. The probability of purchasing flood insurance
increases with the increase of risk perception (Kunreuther,
1996).

The probability of purchasing flood insurance increases with the
presence of a mortgage (Browne and Hoyt, 2000; Kriesel and
Landry, 2004; Landry and Jahan-Parvar, 2010).
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Expected
Sign
+
+

+

Table 3 (continued)
House Type

It is hypothesized that the homeowner of a single family house
detached from other houses has more probability of purchasing
insurance because NFIP’s insurance premium rate is lower
compared to the other house types under the same coverage level.

+

CRS (Community The probability of purchasing flood insurance increases with
Rating System)
the decrease of the CRS class or the increase of a CRS

-

Flood Zone

+

Previous
Experience
PreFIRM

Distance from the
Coast
Income
Age
Gender
Education
Insurance
Confidence

Expected
Government Aid

participating degree (Zahran et al., 2009).

The probability of purchasing flood insurance increases when the
property is located in a high risk area such as a SFHA (Landry and
Jahan-Parvar, 2010; Michel-Kerjan and Kousky, 2010).
If a household had a previous flood damage experience, his or
her probability to purchase flood insurance increases based on
the severity of damage experience (Browne and Hoyt, 2000;
Zahran et al., 2009).

If a property is constructed before the publication of FIRM,
the probability of the property owner purchasing flood
insurance decreases because, after the FIRM publication,
the NFIP gives a disincentive for the construction.

It is hypothesized that the probability of purchasing flood
insurance decreases with the increase of distance from the coast
because the greater the distance from the coast lessens
the potential risk of damage of flood.

The probability of purchasing flood insurance increases
with the increase in income (Browne and Hoyt, 2000;
Kriesel and Landry, 2004; Landry and Jahan-Parvar, 2010).

The probability of purchase flood insurance increases as the age
of the property owner increases (Pynn and Ljung, 1999; Nguyen
et al., 2010).
Females would have a higher probability for purchasing flood
insurance (Riddel, 2009).
As education levels increases, so does the probability of flood
insurance purchasing (Baumann and Sims, 1978; Zahran et al.,
2009).
It is hypothesized that the probability to purchase flood
insurance increases as a person has a stronger confidence in an
insurance company paying for their losses. Due to the fact that
people believe that insurance companies have certain abilities
and responsibilities to insured people, they willingly purchase
flood insurance to reduce their own risks.
It is hypothesized that the probability to purchase flood
insurance decreases as a person has a stronger confidence in
government aid. Because government aid and insurance have a
substitutional relationship, it is expected that the confidence for
one will decrease the confidence for another.
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CHAPTER V
DATA
This chapter explains how the data were collected and will provide a general
description of the data. The data were collected through online surveys, primarily,
focusing on the residents of coastal area.
The survey consisted of 41 questions. Some questions were open ended, and
others were discrete or multiple choice questions. Follow up questions were, sometimes,
provided to ask for additional comments to get detailed explanations. The survey
questions were classified into four categories: geographic information (g), flood
insurance policy related information (p), attitude towards a risk (r), and demographic
information (d). Geographic information includes the property’s distance from the coast
as well as state and metropolitan area information. Flood insurance questions collected
information related to the important determinants of a NFIP insurance premium; such as
mortgage presence, CRS level, etc. Attitude towards risk questions included individuals’
risk perception, risk ambiguity, and risk preference. Demographic questions included age,
gender, education level, income, etc. All questions are not listed in this chapter; for more
detail, please refer to the survey sample later in this paper.
The definitions of risk preference and risk perception are declared in the
definition section in Chapter 1. The following is a discussion on the measurement method
of these two variables, risk preference and risk ambiguity. Risk preference is measured
using a lottery method. Holt and Laury (2002) elicited the individual’s risk aversion by
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asking a series of choice pairs. Of the total five choices, one choice is selected as the
prize of the lottery, and the respondent will receive real money based on the lottery. It is
assumed that real money elicits more accurate human behaviors than other compensation
methods, and thus, this lottery method is a prevailing method to elicit human’s risk
preference. In the survey, we used the same format of Holt and Laury’s lottery questions.
Two different ways are used to elicit risk preference: a gain scenario and a loss scenario.
Both scenarios are represented in each of the five choice pairs with a different probability
and an expected return. In the gain scenario, the people will receive money, but in the
loss scenario, they will lose their money depending on the respondent’s choices and the
lottery. Because the real money compensation or deduction relies on the respondent’s
choice, people should ponder their decision among options to make a bigger gain or a
smaller loss. This decision-making process releases an individual’s risk preference. The
five different pairs of choices which people are given under the gain scenario starts at
A. A 1-out-of-10 chance of gaining $5 and a 9-out-of-10 chance of gaining $4 and
B. A 1-out-of-10 chance of gaining $9.50 and a 9-out-of-10 chance of gaining
$0.50.
Finally, it ends with
A. A 9-out-of-10 chance of gaining $5 and a 1-out-of-10 chance of gaining $4 and
B. A 9-out-of-10 chance of gaining $9.50 and a 1-out-of-10 chance of gaining
$0.50.
In the first choice pair, a bigger compensation has a lower probability to win, but
at the end a bigger compensation has a higher probability to win. The difference between
choices A and B constitutes a risk-taking attitude because the difference of winning
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prizes for choice B is a greater than choice A. How the choice represents a risk
preference will be discuss later.
We used two questions to elicit an individual’s risk perception and to test the
impact of different elicitations. An individual’s expected risk is measured by using an
expected number of major hurricanes in the next 50 years and by using expected damage
on properties caused by a major hurricane. As mentioned earlier, a hurricane is a major
cause of floods, coastal residents perceive that hurricanes and floods are closely related.
Risk perception questions were asked regarding hurricanes instead of floods for improved
understanding. In order to help respondents’ understand the devastating power of a risky
event detailed information given about the hurricane, such as a Category 3 or greater
hurricane with winds of 111mph or great. Therefore, using risk for hurricanes as the
measurement of one’s perceived flood risk is not perfect, but it is a reasonable proxy for
coastal flooding risk. The following are examples of hurricane frequency questions to
elicit risk perception:
“Based on your experience, how many major hurricanes (Category 3 or greater,
with winds of 111 mph or greater) do you expect to directly strike your community
over the next 50 years?” (the most likely perceived)
“Given your previous answer, how many would you say is the most that you could
reasonably expect over the next 50 years?” (the highest perceived)
“Given your previous answer, how many would you say is the least that you could
reasonably expect over the next 50 years?” (the lowest perceived)
Additionally, the expected magnitude of damage by a major hurricane strike is
asked as a different measurement of risk perception. The following are examples of
perceived magnitude of damage:
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“Suppose a Category 3 hurricane (wind speeds of 111-130 mph) did directly
strike your community. How much damage (expressed as percentage of total
structural value) do you think home would most likely suffer?” (the most likely
perceived)
“Given your previous answer, what is the most damage to your home that you
could reasonably expect from a Category 3 hurricane?” (the highest perceived)
“Given your previous answer, what is the least damage to your home that you
could reasonably expect from a Category 3 hurricane?” (the lowest perceived)
The response from the most likely perceived question represents the mean of a person’s
risk perception. Risk ambiguity is measured by reanalyzing the responses of the risk
perception questions. The methods pf how risk perception is converted to risk ambiguity
were already discussed in Chapter 3.
Data Collection
The data were collected via an online survey contracted through Knowledge
Networks (KN). KN is the only online survey firm who offers a probability-based
sample. The sample was selected based on a random-digit dialing (RDD) or addressbased sampling. Then, KN comprises a “Knowledge Panel” whom is randomly recruited
by telephone and by self-administered mail and web surveys. Because KN conducts
online surveys, the company provides internet access and equipment to non-internet
accessible panelists in order to avoid a biased sample that would stem from a limitation
of internet accessibility. The data collection was conducted during August and September
2010. A total of 1536 people were invited; 1070 people completed the survey, and the
number of consented responses was 859. The consented rate is 80.3%, but based on the
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number of the invited panel, the response rate is 55.92%. Compared to existing survey
response rates, this percentage indicates a very high response rate. The respondents were
18 years of age or older, homeowners, and residents in one of the 93 coastal or nearcoastal flood-prone counties in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.
Because the primary purpose of conducting a survey is to observe the behaviors of the
coastal and flood-prone area residents, we asked NK to include some specific counties’
residents in the sample.
Unfortunately, some survey questions may have raised confusion to the
respondents, and thus they provided some nonsensical responses. For instance, some
people gave a higher mean-expectation than the highest-expectation, and rarely some
gave a higher lowest-expectation than the mean or the highest-expectation. We concluded
that the respondents who provide these irrational answers do not fully understand the
intention of the question; so, we dropped the data set of these respondents. After dropping
all ineligible data, we finally have 446 observations that can be usable for estimation. All
the following estimations have the same observation number, 446.
Survey Results
On Table 4, the demographic information of both the sample and the population is
presented. The demographic data of population is provided by NK. Compared with the
population, our sample is comprised of older people, more female, more white, and more
educated people. In the sample, 79.4% of people were 45 years of age or older, while
these respondents only comprise 71.12% of the actual population. The sample also has a
slightly bigger proportion of female (55.65%) than the actual population (50.02%). The
ethnic composition is similar; white takes the largest portion, and hispanic/other and
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black follow, respectively. Education levels show a significant difference between the
population and the sample. As education level increases, the portion also increases in the
sample. Thus, bachelor or above level takes the largest portion in the sample. On the
other hand, in population, high school or below takes the largest portion, and bachelor or
above takes the second largest. When combined, more than three fourths (77.53%) of the
sample has at least some college level education, while 61.01% of the population are
located in that education level. Therefore, the sample consists of people with a higher
education level. The regional distributions and the comparisons about living in a
metropolitan area between the sample and the population are similar. Another significant
difference between the sample and the population can be seen in the ability to access the
internet. Only 5% of the sample does not have internet access while more than 25% of
the population does not have internet access. It may be because KN is an online based
survey company despite the fact that the company also recruits people without internet
access.

39

Table 4

Comparison of Demographic Information of Sample and Population

=
Sample (N 859)
18-44
0.206
45-59
0.360
60+
0.434
Gender
Male
0.444
Ethnicity
White
0.814
Black
0.056
Hispanic, Other
0.130
Education
High school or below
0.225
Some college
0.317
Bachelor or above
0.458
State
AL or MS
0.038
FL
0.612
LA
0.121
TX
0.229
0.050
Metropolitan Area Non-Metro
Metro
0.950
No
0.056
Internet
Yes
0.944
Age

Population
0.289
0.309
0.402
0.500
0.739
0.086
0.175
0.390
0.268
0.342
0.043
0.641
0.136
0.180
0.062
0.938
0.277
0.723

Table 5 describes the summary statistics of the demographic information of the
survey responses. The average age of respondents is 56 years, and the average number of
people per household is 2.47 persons. More female respondents (54%) participated than
male respondents (46%). Some college is the average level of education, and bachelor or
above takes more than half. Respondents are white (84.9%), hispanic (8.1%), black
(3.4%), and other races (1.6%). The average income falls between $50,000 and $59,999
range. 56.9% of total are currently employed. The largest portion is taken by the
working-paid group (46.4%), and the second largest share is non-working- retired group
(28.9%). Most respondents are living with a spouse (68.8%). In order to increase the
explanatory power of these two variables, working status and marital status, these
responses were transformed into a binary form. For example, any forms of employed
statuses are included in a working group, and all others are included in a non-working
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group. Married and living with a partner were combined together because cohabitating is
assumed to affect one’s decision-making. Therefore, marital status consists of
married/cohabitating or having no one.
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Category

Category

Working Status

Category

Ethnicity

Marital Status

Type
Continuous
Continuous
Binary
Category

Description
Respondent’s age
The number of people in respondent’s household
Gender of respondent (0=Female / 1=Male)
Education level
1= Less than High School
2= High School
3= Some College
4= Bachelor’s Degree or above
Races of respondents
1= White, Non-Hispanic
2= Black, Non-Hispanic
3= Other, Non-Hispanic
4= Hispanic
5= 2+ Races, Non-Hispanic
Current status of marriage
1= Married
2= Widowed
3= Divorced
4= Separated
5= Never Married
6= Living with a partner
Current working condition
1= Working-paid employee
2= Working-self-employed
3= Not working-temp. layoff

Summary Description of Demographic Characteristics (N=446)

Variable
Age
Household Size
Gender
Education

Table 5
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Mean
56.00
2.47
0.46
3.31
(2.2%)
(15.5%)
(31.2%)
(51.1%)
1.39
(84.9%)
(3.4%)
(1.6%)
(8.1%)
(2.0%)
1.93
(68.8%)
(4.9%)
(11.4%)
(0.5%)
(8.1%)
(6.3%)
2.92
(46.4%)
(10.5%)
(0.7%)
2.10

1.60

1.00

Std. Dev.
13.45
1.27
0.50
0.81

1

1

1

Min.
19
1
0
1

7

6

5

Max.
85
8
1
4
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Household Income Category

(Table 5 Continued)

4= Not working-looking for work
5= Not working-retired
6= Not working-disabled
7= Not working-other
Total household members’ income
1= less than $5,000
2= $5,000 to $7,499
3= $7,500 to $9,999
4= $10,000 to $12,499
5= $12,500 to $14,999
6= $15,000 to $19,999
7= $20,000 to $24,999
8= $25,000 to $29,999
9= $30,000 to $34,999
10= $35,000 to $39,999
11= $40,000 to $49,999
12= $50,000 to $59,999
13= $60,000 to $74,999
14= $75,000 to $84,999
15= $85,000 to $99,999
16= $100,000 to $124,999
17= $125,000 to $149,999
18= $150,000 to $174,999
19= $175,000 or more

(4.1%)
(28.9%)
(3.8%)
(5.6%)
12.74
(0.9%)
(0.5%)
(1.1%)
(0.7%)
(1.4%)
(1.6%)
(4.3%)
(4.9%)
(2.9%)
(6.7%)
(8.9%)
(8.0%)
(13.9%)
(7.4%)
(11.0%)
(9.2%)
(5.8%)
(4.5%)
(5.8%)
3.86

1

19

In order to observe the relationship between insurance policy holing and
demographic characteristics, Table 6 to 12 will describe the share of insurance policy
holders and non-policy holders by each variable. According to Table 6, in small
household sizes, the share of non-insurance almost twice as large, but in medium size, the
share of insured people increases. Table 7 shows that the shares of insured and uninsured
groups are similar in different genders.
Table 6

Distribution of Insurance Policy Holder by Household Size

Household Size
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Total
Table 7
Gender
Male
Female
Total

Has Insurance
28 (35.90%)
74 (34.10%)
21 (29.17%)
19 (45.24%)
11 (47.83%)
7 (70.00%)
0 (0%)
1 (33.33%)
161

No Insurance
50 (64.10%)
143 (65.90%)
51 (70.83%)
23 (57.76%)
12 (52.17%)
3 (30.00%)
1 (100%)
2 (66.67%)
285

Total
78
217
72
42
23
10
1
3
446

Distribution of Insurance Policy Holder by Gender
Has Insurance
80 (33.20%)
81 (39.51%)
161

No Insurance
161 (66.80%)
124 (60.49%)
285

Total
241
205
446

Table 8 and 9 describe the shares according to education level and ethnicity,
respectively. In low education levels, the share of the uninsured group is significantly
bigger than insured group, but the difference decreases in higher education levels. In
Table 9, white, black and other, non-Hispanic races have a significantly larger share of
the uninsured group, and Hispanic and 2+races, non-Hispanic races have similar share.
However, the similarity of last two races stems from the small number of observations.
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Table 8

Distribution of Insurance Policy Holder by Education Categories

Education Level
Less than High School
High School
Some College
Bachelor or Above
Total
Table 9

Has Insurance
3 (30.00%)
14 (20.29%)
52 (37.41%)
92 (40.35%)
161

No Insurance
7 (70.00%)
55 (79.71%)
87 (62.59%)
136 (59.65%)
285

Total
10
69
139
228
446

Distribution of Insurance Policy Holder by Ethnicity

Ethnicity
White
Black
Other, non-Hispanic
Hispanic
2+ race, non-Hispanic
Total

Has Insurance
133 (35.09%)
5 (33.33%)
2 (28.57%)
17 (47.22%)
4 (44.44%)
161

No Insurance
246 (64.91%)
10 (66.67%)
5 (71.43%)
19 (52.78%)
5 (55.56%)
285

Total
379
15
7
36
9
446

Table 10 shows the respondents’ income distribution. In lower income levels
between $7,500 and $19,999, the insured group has a larger share than the other levels,
and in higher income levels between $85,000 and $149,999, the insured group also shows
a larger share than the other levels. In Table 11, two employed statuses have similar share
of insured and uninsured groups. Interestingly, the uninsured group’s share of disabled
people is significantly higher than the share of insured group. Also, almost all people that
responded as ‘looking for a job’ are not insured. In Table 12, the majority of respondents
are married, with other marital statuses being similar except ‘divorced’ and ‘separated’
statuses.
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Table 10

Distribution of Insurance Policy Holder by Income

Income
less than $5,000
$5,000 to $7,499
$7,500 to $9,999
$10,000 to $12,499
$12,500 to $14,999
$15,000 to $19,999
$20,000 to $24,999
$25,000 to $29,999
$30,000 to $34,999
$35,000 to $39,999
$40,000 to $49,999
$50,000 to $59,999
$60,000 to $74,999
$75,000 to $84,999
$85,000 to $99,999
$100,000 to $124,999
$125,000 to $149,999
$150,000 to $174,999
$175,000 or more
Total

Table 11

Has Insurance
0
0
2 (40.00%)
2 (60.67%)
3 (50.00%)
3 (42.86%)
7 (36.84%)
6 (27.27%)
5 (38.46%)
3 (10.00%)
13 (32.50%)
11 (28.95%)
18 (29.03%)
11 (33.33%)
24 (48.98%)
16 (39.02%)
12 (45.15%)
7 (35.00%)
18 (69.23%)
161

No Insurance
4 (100%)
2 (100%)
3 (60.00%)
1 (33.33%)
3 (50.00%)
4 (57.14%)
12 (63.16%)
16 (72.73%)
8 (61.54%)
27 (90.00%)
27 (67.50%)
27 (71.05%)
44 (70.97%)
22 (66.67%)
25 (51.02%)
25 (60.98%)
14 (53.85%)
13 (65.00%)
8 (30.77%)
285

Distribution of Insurance Policy Holder by Working Status

Working Status
Has Insurance
Working-Paid employ
78 (37.68%)
Working-Self employ
17 (36.17%)
Not working-Temp. Lay-off 2 (66.67%)
Not working-Looking for a job 1 (5.50%)
Not working-Retired
49 (37.98%)
Not working-Disabled
5 (29.41%)
Not working-Others
9 (36.00%)
Total
161
Table 12

Total
4
2
5
3
6
7
19
22
13
30
40
38
62
33
49
41
26
20
26
446

No Insurance
129 (62.32%)
30 (63.83%)
1 (33.33%)
17 (94.50%)
80 (62.02%)
12 (70.59%)
16 (64.00%)
285

Total
207
47
3
18
129
17
25
446

Distribution of Insurance Policy Holder by Marital Status

Marital Status
Married
Widowed
Divorced
Separated
Never married
Living with a partner
Total

Has Insurance
108 (35.18%)
9 (40.91%)
15 (29.41%)
0
16 (44.44%)
13 (46.43%)
161
46

No Insurance
199 (64.82%)
13 (59.09%)
36 (70.59%)
2 (100%)
20 (55.56%)
15 (53.57%)
285

Total
307
22
51
2
36
28
446

Table 13 depicts the summary description of flood insurance policy variables.
Since the insurance question is binary (whether a person has flood insurance or not, no=0
and yes=1), the mean value falls between 0 and 1. Therefore, the mean value of the
insurance variable (0.36) can be interpreted that 36% of the respondents have a flood
insurance policy. In the same way, 63% of respondents have a mortgage loan on their
property. The finding that 212 out of 308 people (68.8%) who currently have flood
insurance have kept flood insurance for their entire tenure is particularly interesting.
Some researchers have reported that many people drop their insurance policies in a few
years, but our finding differs from their reports.
Originally, 52% of respondents answered that their properties are not located in a
flood zone, and 24% of respondents were not sure about their flood zone or did not know
their properties are located in a flood zone. Due to the lack of unawareness of property
owners, many data for flood zones were missed. In order to improve the quality and
quantity of flood zone data, additional information were collected by looking for the
flood zone of each property manually. After additional data collection, the flood zones of
all the properties were founded except for 22 properties, and then flood zone data were
divided into only two groups: properties located in a Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA)
or properties located in a non-SFHA. As a result, it is found that 37% of total properties
are located in a SFHA. In addition to survey data, the class of Community Rating System
(CRS) of the community where a property is located and the property construction year
were collected. Although originally CRS class is divided into 10 classes, all responses
fall between a class 5 and a class 10. The average level is a class 7 which means a
community in a SFHA receives a15 % flood insurance premium reduction while a
community in a non-SFHA receives 5 % reduction. Through the construction year,
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properties were identified as whether they were constructed before the publication of the
FIRM (Flood Insurance Rating Map) or not. 37% of total properties were constructed
before the publication of FIRM. House type is also a determining factor of NFIP’s
insurance premium; so, we assumed that housing type will affect the decision-making for
flood insurance purchasing. People were given 5 choices: 1) a one-family house detached
from other houses, 2) a one-family house attached to one or more houses, 3) a building
with 2 or more apartment, 4) a mobile home, 5) boat, RV, van, etc. From responses,
85.2% of the total respondents lived in a single family house detached from other houses.
Since other house types have small number of responses, house type variable is turned
into a binary form to observe the difference between a single family house detached from
other houses and other house types.
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Table 13
Variable

Summary Description of Characteristics Involving Flood Insurance Policy
(N=446)
Type

Description

Mean

Std. Min Max
Dev.
0.36
0
1

0.36
Whether a person has flood
insurance or not (1=Yes,0=No)
0.48
Mortgage
Binary
Whether a person has mortgage 0.66
loan or not (1=Yes, 0=No)
Whether a property is located in 0.17
0.37
SFHA
Binary
SFHA(Special Flood Hazard
Area) or not (1=Yes, 0=No)
CRS
Category Premium reduction based on
6.97
1.48
participating NFIP
(Community
5=25%(SFHA)/10%(non-SFHA) (18%)
Rating
6=20%(SFHA)/10%(non-SFHA) (22%)
System)
7=15%(SFHA)/5%(non-SFHA) (30%)
8=10%(SFHA)/5%(non-SFHA) (14%)
9=5%(SFHA)/5%(non-SFHA) (4%)
10= no reduction for both
(11%)
Whether a property is constructed 0.37
0.48
PreFIRM
Binary
before the publication of
FIRM(Flood Insurance Rating
Map) (1=Yes, 0=No)
1.30
0.78
House Type Category Housing type
1= A house detached from others (85%)
2= A house attached to others
(5%)
3= Apartments complex
(5%)
4= A mobile home
(5%)
5= Boat, RV, Van, etc.
(0%)
* There vce variable shoreline.dataocated in 2 km from the shoreline,
Insurance

Binary

0

1

0

1

5

10

0

1

1

4

From Table 14 to 18, detailed comparisons about flood insurance policy variables
between insured and uninsured groups are described. In Table 14, the share of insured
and uninsured groups is similar in having a mortgage and no mortgage statuses.
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Table 14

Distribution of Insurance Policy Holder by Mortgage Status

Mortgage Status
Has Mortgage
No Mortgage
Total

Has Insurance
50 (32.68%)
111 (37.88%)
161

No Insurance
103 (67.32%)
182 (62.12%)
285

Total
153
293
446

Table 15 shows that people live in a SFHA have a twice large share of insured
respondents, and most respondents who live in a non-SFHA are not insured. It seems
reasonable that people in high risk more likely to purchase insurance than people in low
risk.
Table 15
SFHA
SFHA
Non-SFHA
Total

Distribution of Insurance Policy Holder by SFHA
Has Insurance
56 (75.68%)
105 (28.23%)
161

No Insurance
18 (24.32%)
267 (71.77%)
285

Total
74
372
446

Table 16 describes the policy holder distribution by CRS classes. The responses
for class 9 are significantly low in both insured and uninsured groups, but the reason is
not clear. For class 9 and 5, the insured group has a larger share, but other classes have a
larger share of uninsured people. The comparison of the preFIRM variable between
insured and uninsured groups is not different in Table 17; about one third of respondents
are insured in both before FIRM and after FIRM.

50

Table 16

Distribution of Insurance Policy Holder by CRS Class

CRS
Class 5
Class 6
Class 7
Class 8
Class 9
Class 10
Total
Table 17

No Insurance
38 (48.10%)
76 (76.00%)
95 (69.54%)
40 (61.54%)
8 (47.06%)
28 (58.33%)
285

Has Insurance
41 (51.90%)
24 (24.00%)
42 (30.66%)
25 (38.46%)
9 (52.94%)
20 (41.67%)
161

Total
79
100
137
65
17
48
446

Distribution of Insurance Policy by preFIRM

FIRM

Has Insurance

No Insurance

Total

Before FIRM

101 (36.20%)

178 (63.80%)

279

After FIRM

60 (35.93%)

107 (64.07%)

167

Total

161

285

446

Table 18 shows the comparison of the house type variable. Most people live in a
single family house detached from other houses, and there is no response for the RV,
Van, and etc. house type in the data used in the models. The uninsured group has
significant larger share in mobile homes. This can be interpreted in two ways: a lack of
interest to buy insurance or a lack of financial source to buy insurance.
Table 18

Distribution of Insurance Policy Holder by House Type

House Type
Detached House
Attached House
Apartments
Mobile Home
RV, Van, and Etc
Total

Has Insurance
141 (37.11%)
7 (30.43%)
9 (45.00%)
4 (17.39%)
0
161
51

No Insurance
239 (62.89%)
16 (69.57%)
11 (55.00%)
19 (82.61%)
0
285

Total
380
23
20
23
0
446

Table 19 explains the geographic characteristics of properties. The state variable
shows in what state the property is located. Most of the properties are located in Florida;
the second largest concentration is in Texas; and others are less than 10%. The mean of
metro variable, 0.95, shows that 95% of properties are located in a metropolitan area so it
seems hard to observe the different impact between the metro and non-metro areas. In
addition to the survey data, the distance from the nearest shoreline of each property is
observed using GIS. The distance from a property to the shoreline was measured based
on the property address. The mean distance from the coast is 15.61 kilometers (9.7mies).
Figure 4 presents the histogram of the distance variable. As the distance from the coasts
increases, the density of responses decreases. Therefore, most of the properties are
located within 40km from the shoreline, and the highest density appears in the 0 and 4km
interval.
Table 19

Summary Description of Geographic Characteristics (N=446)

Variable

Type

State

Category

Metro
Distance
from the
Coast(km)

Description

Mean

Std.
Dev.
1.71

2.11
State where properties are
located
(67.7%)
1=Florida
(3.1%)
2=Alabama
(1.6%)
3=Mississippi
(5.2%)
4=Louisiana
(22.4 %)
5=Texas
0.95
0.22
Binary
Whether a property is located
in a metropolitan area
(Yes=1, No=0)
Continuous The distance from the nearest 15.61
18.51
shoreline to a property

52

Min

Max

1

5

0

1

0

171.7

Figure 4

Histogram of Distances from the Coasts

In Table 20, the state with the largest responses, Florida, and the state with the
smallest responses, Alabama/Mississippi show a larger uninsured group share while other
states have a bigger insured group share. Since the largest number of flood insurance
policies were issued in Florida, this result seems awkward.
Table 20

Distribution of Insurance Policy Holder by States

State
Florida
Texas
Louisiana
Alabama/Mississippi
Total

Has Insurance
86 (28.48%)
55 (55.00%)
13 (56.52%)
7 (33.33%)
161

No Insurance
216 (71.52%)
45 (45.00%)
10 (43.48%)
14 (66.67%)
285

Total
302
100
23
21
446

Table 21 shows the share by metropolitan area. In metro areas, insured group’s
share is larger than insured group’s share in non-metro areas.
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Table 21

Distribution of Insurance Policy Holder by Metro

Metropolitan
Metro area
Non-metro area
Total

Has Insurance
157 (37.03%)
4 (18.18%)
161

No insurance
267 (62.97%)
18 (81.82%)
285

Total
424
22
446

Table 22 describes the summary description of risk variables. Hurricane
frequency, magnitude of damage, and expected damage are risk perception measuring
variables. Hurricane frequency is the frequency of a major hurricane strikes in the next 50
years, and magnitude of damage measures the magnitude of damage on owned property
from a major hurricane. The frequency responses range from 1 to 99 as a whole number
while the magnitude of damage is expressed as a percentage of the total structure value.
The respondents most likely expect the number of a major hurricane strikes in the next 50
years to be 6.08 times. The average expected severity of damage is 4.25; on average,
people expect that 42.5 % of the total structure value will be destroyed once a major
hurricane hits their properties. From two risk perception responses, expected damage is
calculated by multiplying the frequency and magnitude. The number of frequency is
divided by 50 to calculate the expected frequency of a given year, and the magnitude is
divided by 10 to convert responses into a probability form. The most likely expected
damage is 0.04, and that means that people expect their damage by a major hurricane in a
given year as 4%.
Risk aversion is measured on a 1 to 6 scale with 6 meaning that the respondent is
extremely risk-averse in both gain and loss scenarios. The means of the two scenarios are
not very different. The means are 3.96 for the gain scenario and 3.93 for the loss
scenario; these values show that, on average, people are risk-averse in both scenarios.
About 36% of total respondents experienced flood damage before. Moreover, people
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have medium level (3.02) of confidence for an insurance company’s compensation, and
the expectation for government aid is slightly lower than medium level (2.68). The
confidence for an insurance company is slightly stronger than expectation for
governmental aid.
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Risk Aversion

Expected
Damage

Magnitude of
damage

Variable
Hurricane
Frequency

Table 22

Ordered
Categorical
Ordered
Categorical

Expected Gov.
Aid

Ordered
Categorical
Ordered
Categorical
Binary

Continuous

Continuous

Type
Continuous

Insurance
Confidence

Loss

Mean
Most
Least
Mean
Most
Least
Mean
Most
Least
Gain

Mean
6.08
9.52
2.71
Individual’s perceived property magnitude of damage 4.25
by a major hurricane in percentage (1=0 %, 11=100 6.45
%)
2.28
Product of frequency and magnitude calculated as the0.04
probability in a given year
0.10
0.01
Risk aversion measured by gaining money lottery;
3.89
larger number implies more risk aversion attitude
Risk aversion measured by losing money lottery;
3.96
larger number implies more risk aversion attitude
Individual’s previous flood damage
0.36
experience(1=experienced, 0=no experience)
3.07
Confidence for an insurance company’s
compensation once flooding (1=no confidence, 5=full
confidence)
Expectation for Governmental aid once
2.68
flooding(1=very unlikely, 5= very likely)

Description
Individual’s perceived number of major hurricanes
strikes in the next 50 years

Summary Description of Attitudes Toward Risk (N=446)

Previous Damage
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1

1

1.22
1.15

0

1

Min
1
1
0
2
3
1
0.02
0
0
1

0.48

1.27

Std. Dev.
8.61
12.64
4.72
2.03
2.49
1.60
0.06
0.16
0.03
1.39

5

5

1

6

Max
75
99
45
11
11
11
0.7
1.50
0.54
6

In risk aversion measurement, people make a decision based on their attitudes
toward risks and the expected value of a choice. Between two choices, one choice always
has a higher expected value than another. Table 23 shows the expected value of each
choice in a lottery. For example, in Q1 choice A ($4.1) has a higher expected value than
choice B ($1.4), and in Q4, choice B ($6.8) has a higher expected value than choice A
($4.7). Expected values of choice A do not changed a lot, but the expected values of
choice B steeply increase. In the first question choice A has a higher expected value, but
in third question expected value of choice B is higher than choice A.
Table 23
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5

Expected Value of Each Lottery Question
Expected Value of Choice A
0.1*$5+0.9*$4= $4.1
0.3*$5+0.7*$4= $4.3
0.5*$5+0.5*$4= $4.5
0.7*$5+0.3*$4= $4.7
0.9*$5+0.1*$4= $4.9

Expected Value of Choice B
0.1*$9.5+0.9*$0.5= $1.4
0.3*$9.5+0.7*$0.5= $3.2
0.5*$9.5+0.5*$0.5= $5.0
0.7*$9.5+0.3*$0.5= $6.8
0.9*$9.5+0.1*$0.5= $8.9

However, the choice is decided not only based on expected value but also based
on one’s risk attitude. Because each prize has different probability, risk-averse people
always prefer a lower risk choice in spite of a low expected value. Therefore, in the gain
scenario, it is expected that risk-averse people choose choice A in Q1, and then
depending on the magnitude of risk-averse people choose choice B in some points. The
same is true for the loss scenario except vice versa. The following two graphs, Figure 5
and 6, show responses for risk aversion queries graphically. As shown below, the trend of
selection change is in accordance with the hypothesis of the lottery experiment.
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Figure 5

Proportion of Choices for the Gain Scenario (N=446)

Figure 6

Proportion of Choices for the Loss Scenario (N=446)

Theoretically, the switch of a choice occurs one time because the risk increases or
decreases if the respondent stays in one direction the entire time. Table 24 shows the first
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shifting point of the choice. Based on theoretical expectations, people have to shift their
choices from choice A to choice B under the gain scenario and shift from choice B to
choice A under the loss scenario. For example, 2nd (ABBBB) means that a person
changes his choice from choice A to choice B in the second question and keeps choice B
for the rest of questions. The number of people who changed their choices during the 1st
or 2nd question (23.51 %) in the loss scenario is greater than the number in the gain
scenario (11.64 %), and the number of people who changed their choices during the 3rd
question in the loss scenario is also larger than the number in the gain scenario.
Therefore, people tend to be more risk-neutral or risk-loving when they are confronted
with potentially losing money.
However, an earlier mentioned problem appeared. Some people shift their choices
again and again. For example, a person starts with choice A, shifts to choice B in the 3rd
question, and then shifts to choice A in the 4th question. Here are examples of the
possible choice sets which are not in accordance with the theory: ABABA, AABAB,
AABAA, and ABBBA. These unexpected choice sets are counted into the inconsistent
choice on the table. It is not clear why people make inconsistent choices, but we can only
assume that they may not fully understand the concept of the lottery experiment and the
logic of making choices. According to our results, more people have trouble
understanding the lottery experiment under the loss scenario because there are more
inconsistent choices under the loss scenario in comparison to the gain scenario.
Generally, the 3rd question is a middle point and assumed to be the risk-neutral point;
therefore, if a person changes his choice in the 3rd question (AABBB), he is identified as
risk-neutral. In the gain scenario, people who change answers before the 3rd question
(BBBBB and ABBBBB) are risk-loving, and people who change after the 3rd question
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(AAABB and AAAAB) are risk-averse. Moreover, people who did not change to choice
B from choice A (AAAAA) are extremely risk-averse. In the same manner, in the loss
scenario, people who shift to choice A from choice B before the 3rd question (AAAAA
and BAAAA) are risk-loving, and people who change latter than the 3rd question
(BBBAA, BBBBA, and BBBBB) are risk-averse. In order to improve the quality of the
data, the inconsistent choices from both scenarios are deleted for this variable used in the
models, but in Table 24 the entire survey data is presented.
Table 24

Shifting Point of Lottery Choices (N=859)

Shifting point
1st(BBBBB)
2nd(ABBBB)
3rd(AABBB)
4th(AAABB)
5th(AAAAB)
No Change
(AAAAA)
Inconsistent
Choice*
Total

Gain (A to B)
N
Percentage
60
6.98
40
4.66
154
17.93
169
19.67
113
13.15
158
18.39
165

19.21

859

100

Shifting point
1st(AAAAA)
2nd(BAAAA)
3rd(BBAAA)
4th(BBBAA)
5th(BBBBA)
No Change
(BBBBB)
Inconsistent
Choice*
Total

60

Loss (B to A)
N
Percentage
139
16.18
63
7.33
230
26.78
148
17.23
29
3.38
60
6.98
190

22.12

859

100

CHAPTER VI
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATION RESULTS
Empirical Analysis
Mean and range/variance of perceived risk are induced from the same queries,
even though the latter is presenting one’s risk ambiguity. Seemingly unrelated regression
assumes the correlation of error terms in each equation and estimates two or more
equations simultaneously by set of predictor variables. The set of predictor variables in
each equation can be the same or different, and our mean perceived risk and
range/variance perceived risk models have the same set of variables. This method is
efficient than estimating OLS equations separately when there are stack of equations.
There is an example of multiple equation structure:
y1  X1β1  ε1
y 2  X 2β 2  ε 2

y m  Xmβ m  ε m

(13)

Therefore, the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model is written as
y i  Xi βi  ε i ,

i  1,....., m,

(14)

where
ε  ε1 ,ε2 ,...εm 

(15)

and
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E ε | X1 , X 2 ,...., X m   0

E εε | X1 , X 2 ,..., X m   Ω.

(16)

It is assumed that total of T observations are used in estimations of M equations. Each
equation involves Km regressors, for a total of K   i1 Ki . It is also assumed that
n

disturbances are uncorrelated across observations, and thus,
E  it  js | X1 , X 2 ,..., X m    ij , if t=s and 0 otherwise.

(17)

The disturbance formulation is
E ε i εj | X1 , X 2 ,..., X m    ij ΙT or
E εε | X1 , X 2 ,...., X m 

  11Ι  12 Ι   1m Ι 
 Ι  Ι   Ι 
22
2m 
    21
(a)
 




 m1Ι  m2 Ι   mm Ι 

(18)

By applying the generalized regression model to the stacked model,

 y1   X1
  
 y2    0
  
  
y m   0

0  0   β1   ε1 
X 2  0   β 2   ε 2 

 Xβ  ε.
     

   
0  X m  β m  ε m 

(19)

Thus, the efficient estimator of this regression is generalized least squares. For the tth
observation, the m*m covariance matrix of the disturbance is
  11  12   1m 

 22   2m 
21



 



 m1  m2   mm  ,
1

1

So, in (a),    Ι and    Ι.
Denoting the i th element of  1 by  ij , general least square estimator is
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(20)

βˆ   X Ω

1

1

X  X Ω

1

y   X ( 

1

1

 Ι )X  X ( 

1

 Ι )y ( Gr e e n e, 2 0 0 5).

( 2 1)

F or m e a n a n d r a n g e/ v ari a n c e of p er c ei v e d ris k esti m ati o ns, s e e mi n gl y u nr el at e d
r e gr essi o n is a g o o d m et h o d. H o w e v er, t his m a y n ot b e t h e b est f or t h e N FI P p arti ci p ati o n
m o d el si n c e t h e d e p e n d e nt v ari a b l e of t h e N FI P p arti ci p ati o n m o d el is a bi n ar y v ari a bl e.
T h er ef or e, w e s u g g est a n ot h er esti m ati o n m et h o d.
T h e d e p e n d e nt v ari a bl es of m e a n a n d r a n g e / v ari a n c e of p er c ei v ed ris k m o d els ar e
i n cl u d e d i n t h e N FI P p arti ci p atio n m o d el as e x pl a n at or y v ari a bl es. T his c as e is s uit a bl e t o
us e a si m ult a n e o us e q u ati o n m o d el. T h e f oll o wi n g m o d el e q u ati o ns s h o w t h e e x a ct
r el ati o ns hi p of p er c ei v e d ris k m o d els a n d t h e N FI P p arti ci p ati o n m o d el.
y 1*  β x   y 2   ,
y 2   z  u ,
( , u )

 0
N 
 0

  1
 ,
 

y1  1[ y 1*  0],

  
.
 2  

( 2 2)

w h er e y 1 is a bi n ar y v ari a bl e a n d y 2 is a c o nti n u o us v ari a bl e. T h e pr o bl e m wit h t his
m o d el is t h at t h er e is c orr el ati o n b et w e e n t h e y 2 a n d  st e m mi n g fr o m t h e c orr el ati o n of
u a n d  , a n d t h at t h e pr o bit esti m ati o n b as e d o n y 1 a n d ( x 1 , y 2 ) will n ot esti m at e

c o nsist e nt c o effi ci e nts, β a n d  ( Gr e e n e, 2 0 0 7). D u e t o t h e str u ct ur e of m o d el, w e
s us p e ct t h at t h er e is a n e n d o g e n eit y pr o bl e m. E m piri c all y, a n e n d o g e n eit y pr o bl e m c a n
c a us e a m e as ur e m e nt err or, a ut o c orr el ati o n wit h a ut o c orr el at e d err ors, si m ult a n eit y,
o mitt e d v ari a bl es, a n d s a m pl e s el e cti o n err or. Usi n g a n i nstr u m e nt al v ari a bl e (I V) is o n e
of t h e s ol uti o ns t o c orr e ct t h e e n d o g e n eit y. W e utili z e d a t w o-st a g e pr o bit wit h I V
esti m ati o n b as e d o n N e w e y’s ( 1 9 8 7) mi ni m u m c hi-s q u ar e d esti m at or. I n o ur m o d el,
e n d o g e n o us v ari a bl es ar e m e a n p er c ei v e d ris k a n d r a n g e/ v ari a n c e of p er c ei v e d ris k
v ari a bl es b e c a us e t h eir v al u es ar e eli cit e d fr o m t h e s a m e s ur v e y q u esti o ns. S o m e
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d e m o gr a p hi c v ari a bl es ar e ass u m e d t o b e c orr el at e d wit h e n d o g e n o us v ari a bl es,
r a n g e/ v ari a n c e of p er c ei v e ris k a n d m e a n p er c ei v e d ris k, b ut d o n ot dir e ctl y b el o n g t o t h e
ori gi n al e q u ati o n. T h os e v ari a bl es ar e i nstr u m e nt al v ari a bl es b e c a us e t h e c orr el ati o n wit h
t h e e n d o g e n eit y v ari a bl e a n d t h e l a c k of c orr el ati o n wit h t h e r e gr essi o n e q u ati o n is t h e
c o n diti o n t o b e a n i nstr u m e nt. T h e m o d el w it h t h e di c h ot o m o us d ep e n d e nt v ari a bl es a n d
e n d o g e n o us r e gr ess ors is

y 1*i  y 2 iβ  x 1 i γ  u i
y 2 i  x 1 iΠ 1  x 2 iΠ
W h er e i = 1, … …., N,

2

1

( 2 3)

y 2 i is a v e ct or of e n d o g e n o us v ari a bl e s ( m e a n a n d r a n g e/ v ari a n c e

p er c ei v e d ris k v ari a bl es), x 1 i is a v e ct or of e x o g e n o us v ari a bl es ( ori gi n al e x pl a n at or y
v ari a bl es i n t h e e q u ati o n of i nt er est), x 2 i is a v e ct or of i nstr u m e nts (st at e, e m pl o y m e nt,
m arit al st at us, et h ni cit y, a n d m etr o v ari a bl es). It is ass u m e d t h at ( u i , i )



11

N (0 , Σ ) , w h er e

is n or m ali z e d t o o n e will i d e ntif y t h e m o d el. (u i , i ) is i.i. d. m ulti v ari at e n or m al f or

 1
all i . Wit h c o v ari a n c e m atri x v ar( u i , i )    
 21
str u ct ur al p ar a m et ers, a n d Π

1

and Π

2


 . β a n d γ ar e v e ct ors of t h e
 21 


'
21

ar e m atri c es of t h e r e d u c e d-f or m p ar a m et ers.

I nst e a d of o bs er vi n g y 1*i , w e o bs er v e

 0, if y 1*i  0
y1i  
*
 1, if y 1 i  0

( 2 4)

T h e m o d el is r e writt e n as
y 1*i  z iδ  u i

( 1) str u ct ur al e q uati o n of i nt er est

y 2 i  x iΠ   i

( 2) s et of r e d u ce d f or m e q u ati o n of t h e e n d o g e n o us e x pl a n at or y vari a bl es ( 2 5)
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where z i  (y 2i , x1i ), xi  (x1i , x 2i ),δ  (β, γ ), and Π=(Π1 , Π 2 ). By substituting eq(2)
into eq(1)
The reduced form equation of y1*i for two-stage estimation is
y1i*  (xi Π  i )β  x1i γ  ui
= xi α  i β  ui
= xi α  vi

(26)

where vi  i β  ui . vi is normal because ui and i are jointly normal. For estimation,

Π 
I 
α   1  β    γ  D(Π )δ
0 
Π 2 

(27)

Where D(Π )  (Π, I1 ) and I1 is defined as xi I1  x1i . Defining
ˆ )δ
ˆ )  (Π
ˆ ,I )
zˆ i  (xi Π̂, x1i ), ẑ i δ  xi D(Π
D(Π
1 . Thus one estimator of α is
, where
ˆ )δ , and this estimator is denoted by D̂δ .
D(Π

α could also be estimated directly as the solution to
N

max  l ( y1i , xi α  ̂i λ)
α ,λ

(28)

i1

Where l() is the log likelihood for probit. Denote this estimator by α . Because the
multivariate normality of the error terms (ui ,i ) implies the expected value of ui is not
zero, the ̂i λ term is included here. i is an unobservable term, so the least-squares
residuals from eq (2) is used.
Amemiya (1978) defined the estimator of δ by
max(α  D̂δ)̂ 1 (α  D̂δ)

(29)

δ

Where ̂ is a consistent estimator of the covariance of

N (α̂  D̂δ) , and the estimator of

δ is asymptotically efficient relative to all the other estimators that minimize the distance

ˆ )δ. Therefore, an efficient estimator of δ is defined as
between α̂ and D(Π

65

ˆ 1 D
ˆ 
ˆ 1α
ˆ 
ˆ 1D)
δˆ  (D
and

(30)

ˆ 1 .
ˆ 
ˆ 1D)
Var(δˆ )  (D

To implement this estimator, ̂1 should be known.
The two-stage maximum likelihood estimator is obtained by solving
N

max  l ( y1i , z i δ  ̂i λ)
δ,λ

(31)

i 1

Residuals ̂i  y 2i  xi Π̂ is computed by fitting equation (2) using OLS.
Newey(1987) induced

d

N (α̂  D̂δ)  N (0, Ω);

N (α̂  D̂δ) converges in distribution

to N (0, Ω) , where
1
  J
 (λ  β) 22 (λ  β)Q1

and



22

(32)

 

1
 E ii . J 
is the covariance matrix of α , ignoring that Π̂ is an estimated

parameter matrix. Also, Newey demonstrates that the covariance matrix from an OLS
regression of y 2i (λˆ  βˆ ) on xi is a consistent estimator of (λ  β) 22 (λ  β)Q 1 . λ̂ can
be obtained from solving equation (3), and the two-stage instrumental variables estimator
yields a consistent estimate, β̂ (STATA, 2009).
The structure of the two-stage probit with IV estimation does not allow to exclude
some unrelated variables from the first stage estimation if those variables have to be
included in the second stage estimation. There is no supporting theories showing the
relationship between range/variance of perceived risk and flood insurance policy related
variables such as CRS, preFIRM, or house type variables, but the range/variance of
perceived risk models have to include those variables because of the structure of the twostage probit with IV estimation . Including unrelated variables in estimations would
distort the result. Therefore, the estimation results of seemingly unrelated regression are
reported for mean, range, and variance of perceived risk models while the results of
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probit with IV estimation are reported for the NFIP participation model. By combining
range and variance of perceived risk and three different mean perceived risks, a total of
six models will be estimated in each stage. Table 25 explains the summary statistics of
the explanatory variables used in estimation models.
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6.40
1.39

3.25
3.67

Continuous between 0-198

One’s risk preference toward risk
Between 1-6 scale, 1 if very risk loving; 6 if very risk aversion 3.89

0.36
0.48

0.85
0.66
3.07

1 if a single family house detached from other houses; 0 if
otherwise
1 if having mortgage loan; 0 if otherwise
Between 1-5 scale, 1 if no confidence; 5 if full confidence

1.22

0.37 0.48
15.61 18.51

1.48
0.37
0.48

Between 1-10 scale, 1 if full participation; 10 if no participation 6.97
1 if SFHA; 0 if otherwise
0.17
1 if having flood damage experience; 0 if otherwise
0.36
1 if before FIRM; 0 if otherwise
The distance from the nearest coast in kilometer

1.27

Between 1-6 scales, 1 if very risk loving; 6 if very risk aversion 3.96

2.03

1

0

0

0
0

5
0
0

1

1

0.2

1

5

1

1

1
171.68

10
1
1

6

6

70

10

75

Between 0-10, 0 if no damage; 10 if complete damaged

1

6.08

Continuous between 0-99

8.61

Mean Std.Dev. Min Max

Description
Perceived flood risk in different ways

Description of Explanatory Variables for Models Estimated (N=446)

Variables
Type
Risk
Perception
Hurricane
Continuous
Frequency
Magnitude of Ordered
Damage
Categorical
Expected
Continuous
Damage
Risk Aversion
Gain
Ordered
Categorical
Loss
Ordered
Categorical
CRS
Categorical
Flood Zone Binary
Previous
Binary
Damage
preFIRM
Binary
Distance from Continuous
coast
Detached
Binary
Single House
Having a
Binary
Mortgage
Insurance
Ordered
Confidence Categorical

Table 25
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Binary
Binary
Binary
Binary
Continuous
Binary
Ordered
Categorical

White
Work
Marry
Metro
Age
Male
Income

2.68
0.68

Between 1-5 scale, 1 if very unlikely; 5 if very likely
1 if Florida resident; 0 if otherwise

1 if white; 0 if otherwise
0.85
1 if working in any employment types; 0 if otherwise
0.57
1 if having a spouse or cohabitating; 0 if otherwise
0.75
1 if metro area; 0 if otherwise
0.95
Continuous between 19-93
56.00
1 if male; 0 if female
0.46
1 if less than $5K; 2 if $5K-less than $7.5K
12.74
3 if $7.5K-less than $10K; 4 if $10K-less than $12.5K; 5 if
$12.5K-less than $15K; 6 if $15K-less than $20K; 7 if $20K-less
than $25K; 8 if $25K-less than $30K; 9 if $30K-less than $35K;
10 if $35K- less than $40K; 11 if $40K-less than $50K; 12 if
$50K-less than $60K; 13 if $60K-less than $75K; 14 if $75Kless than $85K; 15 if $85K-less than $100K; 16 if $100K-less
than $125K; 17 is $125K-less than $150K; 18 if $150K-less than
$175K; 19 if $175K or more
Education
Categorical
1 if less than high school; 2 if high school; 3 if some college; 4 if 3.31
bachelor’s degree or above
Range and variance of perceived risk variables are described separately

Ordered
Categorical
Binary

Expected
Gov. Aid
Florida

Table 25 (continued)
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0.81

0.36
0.50
0.73
0.22
13.45
0.50
3.86

0.47

1.15

1

0
0
0
0
19
0
1

0

1

4

1
1
1
1
85
1
19

1

5

Results for Seemingly Unrelated Regression of Risk Ambiguity Model
This section describes the statistical analysis of risk ambiguity model. As
mentioned before, risk ambiguity is measured in two ways: range and variance of
perceived risk. Range simply measures the difference between the highest risk perception
and the lowest risk perception (Range=H-L). Particularly, triangular variance is used as
another risk ambiguity measurement, so the calculation for variance is
Variance=[( H 2  L2  M 2 )  ( H * L)  ( H * M )  ( L * M )] /18

(33)

when H is the highest value, L is the lowest value, and M is the mean value of an
individual’s risk perception. The two risk ambiguity models using different risk
ambiguity measurement were separately estimated. Table 26 lists the summary statistics
of the different risk ambiguity variables.
Table 26

Summary Description of Different Risk Ambiguity Variables (N=446)

Variable

Type

Description

Range of :
Hurricane
Frequency
Magnitude of
Damage
Expected Damage
Variance of:
Hurricane
Frequency
Magnitude of
Damage
Expected Damage

Risk ambiguity measured
Continuous as range

6.82

9.78

0

89

Continuous

4.17

2.30

0

10

Continuous

9.56

14.82

0.2 140

6.45

25.87

0

353

Continuous

1.02

1.10

0

5.06

Continuous

0.14

0.64

0.2 70

Risk ambiguity measured
Continuous as triangular variance

Mean Std. Dev.Min Max

The perceived hurricane frequency is larger than actual hurricane frequency.
According to NOAA’s data (2012), actual numbers of major hurricane strikes in coastal
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counties between 1900 and 2010 by state are 4.5 times in Fl, 6.4 times in TX, 8 times in
LA and 7.8 times in Al and MS. Despite our sample estimated the frequency of major
hurricanes in 50 years, their expectations are obviously high: 6.1 times in FL, 5.7 times in
TX, 7.4 times in LA, and 6 times in AL and MS. Therefore, the actual average in 50
years of all state is 3.3 times. It is almost twice larger than our sample average, 6.8 times.
Although perceive risk is higher than actual risk, many people do not buy flood insurance
(36% of total are insured).
In the result tables, observation numbers, R 2 s , estimated parameters, standard
errors, and significant levels of explanatory variables are presented. The dependent
variable is range or variance of perceived risk variable, and the independent variables are
risk aversion, mean risk perception, flood zone, damage experience, distance from the
coast, state, ethnicity, work status, marital status, metro, age, gender, income, and
education variables.
Table 27 shows the SUR estimation results of the range perceived risk models
when risk perception is elicited by frequency, magnitude, and expected damage,
respectively. The first column shows the estimates when range perceived risk is measured
as the range of perceived hurricane frequency. In this model, the flood zone, state,
education, and income variables are significant, but no risk variable is significant.
Contrary to our expectation, the flood zone variable is negatively related to range
perceived risk, so a person who lives in a high risk area has less risk ambiguity than a
person who lives in a low flood risk area. A person who lives in Florida has more risk
ambiguity than a person lives in other states. Lastly, education and income are positively
related to risk ambiguity; a person with a higher education level or with a higher income
level shows more risk ambiguity regarding flood risk.
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The second column explains the results of the SUR estimates of the range
perceived risk model when range perceived risk is measured as the range of magnitude of
damage. The mean_risk perception, previous damage, distance from the coasts,
education, and income variables are significant. The significant mean_risk perception
variable means that as a person perceives greater risk, he is more ambiguous about risk.
The previous damage variable has a negative relationship with range perceived risk; if a
person experienced flood damage previously, his risk ambiguity decreases. Contrary to
the hypothesis, when distance from the coast increases, one’s risk ambiguity also
increases. Ethnicity is positively related to range perceived risk, so if a person is white, he
has more risk ambiguity than if he was another ethnicity. Education and income level are
also positively related to risk ambiguity.
The third column shows the estimation results when range perceived risk is
measured as a range of expected damage. The mean_risk perception, ethnicity, education
and income variables are significant. All significant variables are positively related to
range perceived risk. In sum, mean_risk perception shows significance when range
perceived risk is measure as magnitude of damage and expected damage models, but
other risk variables are not significant at all. Education and income variables are
significant over all models.
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Table 27

SUR Estimates of Range of Perceived Risks

Dependent Variable

Hurricane
Frequency
R2 =0.5578
Parameter
(N=446)
(Std. Err.)
Risk Aversion (gain)
0.09(0.22)
Risk Aversion (loss)
0.16(0.23)
Mean_risk perception
1.08(0.03)
Flood Zone(SFHA)
-1.00(0.82) **
Previous Damage
0.58(0.64)
Distance from the Coast
0.01(0.02)
Florida State
1.17(0.65)
*
White
0.85(0.84)
Employed
0.66(0.72)
Married or Cohabitating
-0.51(0.75)
Metro
0.55(1.39)
Age
-0.03(0.03)
Male
-0.08(0.62)
Education
1.15(0.40)
**
Income
0.21(0.09)
**
Constant
-7.96(2.91) **
*, ** significant at p=0.1 and 0.05 respectively

Magnitude of
Damage
R2 =0.0880
Parameter
(Std. Err.)
0.03(0.07)
-0.02(0.08)
0.52(0.05)
**
-0.24(0.28)
-0.54(0.22) **
0.01(0.01)
**
0.17(0.22)
0.60(0.29)
**
0.15(0.25)
0.09(0.26)
-0.47(0.48)
-0.002(0.01)
0.13(0.21)
0.47(0.14)
**
0.07(0.03)
**
-0.49(1.02)

Expected
Damage
R2=0.3859
Parameter
(Std. Err.)
-0.14(0.38)
0.14(0.41)
2.12(0.07)
-2.17(1.45)
0.58(1.13)
0.02(0.03)
1.18(1.15)
2.65(1.49)
1.15(1.27)
-2.06(1.32)
-2.42(2.45)
-0.06(0.05)
0.36(1.09)
1.74(0.71)
0.46(0.16)
-6.72(5.15)

**

*

**
**

Table 28 shows the SUR estimation results of the variance perceived risk models
when risk perception is elicited by frequency, magnitude, and expected damage,
respectively. Compared to the previous range perceived risk models, fewer variables are
statistically significant.
The first column shows the estimates when variance perceived risk is measured as
a variance of hurricane frequency. The mean_risk perception, state, and income variables
are significant. They are all positively related to risk ambiguity. Their estimates are
relatively larger than the previous range perceived risk model. It may because variance
perceived risk has a smaller values and range than range perceived risk.
In the second column, the results of the variance perceived risk model utilizing
the variance of magnitude of damage as risk ambiguity are presented. In this column, the
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mean_risk perception, previous damage, distance from the coast, and education variable
are significant. The mean_risk perception, distance from the coast, and education
variables are positively related to risk ambiguity while previous damage variable shows a
negative relationship with risk ambiguity.
The estimation results of the variance perceived risk model utilizing a variance of
expected damage as risk ambiguity are displayed in the third column. The mean_risk
perception, marital status and education variables are statistically significant. The marital
status variable first shows significance. If a person is married or cohabitating, he has less
risk ambiguity. This is matched with our hypothesis. Overall, the mean_risk perception
variable is significant over all models.
Table 28

SUR Estimates of Variance of Perceived Risks

Dependent Variable

Hurricane
Frequency
R2=0.3775
Parameter
(N=446)
(Std. Err.)
Risk Aversion (gain)
3.16(4.61)
Risk Aversion (loss)
3.47(4.99)
Mean_risk perception
18.75(0.63) **
Flood Zone(SFHA)
-15.72(17.49)
Previous Damage
4.87(13.57)
Distance from the Coast
-0.40(0.45)
Florida State
26.39(13.73) *
White
-0.49(17.98)
Employed
9.16(15.29)
Married or Cohabitating
-10.94(16.04)
Metro
-1.26(29.57)
Age
-0.05(0.56)
Male
-8.67(13.16)
Education
13.36(8.53)
Income
3.67(1.94) *
Constant
-184.92(62.14) **
*, ** significant at p=0.1 and 0.05 respectively
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Magnitude of
Damage
R2=0.0563
Parameter
(Std. Err.)
0.14(0.26)
-0.05(0.29)
1.74(0.17) **
-1.31(0.98)
-1.64(0.77) **
0.04(0.02) **
0.49(0.79)
1.50(1.02)
0.19(0.87)
0.33(0.91)
-1.81(1.68)
0.02(0.03)
0.46(0.75)
1.27(0.48) **
0.16(0.11)
-6.35(3.58) *

Expected
Damage
R2=0.2569
Parameter
(Std. Err.)
0.01(0.02)
-0.01(0.02)
0.09(0.003) **
-0.10(0.07)
0.02(0.05)
-0.001(0.001)
0.07(0.06)
0.06(0.07)
0.05(0.06)
-0.15(0.06) **
-0.15(0.12)
0.001(0.003)
0.01(0.05)
0.05(0.03)
0.02(0.01) **
-0.40(0.24)

Results for Seemingly Unrelated Regression of Risk Perception Model
This section describes the statistical analysis of risk perception estimations. Risk
perception is elicited as a number of major hurricane strikes in nest 50 years, one’s
property damage by a major hurricane strike, and expected damage on the property in a
given year. In the result tables, observation numbers, R 2 s , estimated parameters, standard
errors, and significant levels of explanatory variables are presented. The dependent
variable is one’s perceived risk, and the independent variables are risk aversion, range or
variance perceived risk, flood zone, damage experience, distance from the coast, state,
ethnicity, work status, marital status, metro, age, gender, income, and education
variables.
Table 29 shows the SUR estimation results of the frequency, magnitude, and
expected damage risk perception models including range perceived risk. The range
perceived risk, education, and income variables are statistically significant in all models.
When one’s risk ambiguity increases one’s perceived risk also increases. Increased
education level and income level decreases one’s perceived risk. The state variable
significant in the perceived risk from hurricane frequency model; the distance variable is
significant in the perceived risk from magnitude of damage model; the flood zone
variable is significant in the perceived risk from expected damage model.
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Table 29

SUR Estimates of Mean Perceived Risks with Range Risk Ambiguity

Dependent Variable

Hurricane
Frequency
R2 =0.5495
Parameter
(N=446)
(Std. Err.)
Risk Aversion (gain)
-0.10(0.19)
Risk Aversion (loss)
-0.13(0.21)
Range of Risk Ambiguity
0.86(0.02)
**
Flood Zone(SFHA)
1.18(0.72)
Previous Damage
-0.48(0.57)
Distance from the Coast
-0.01(0.01)
Florida State
-0.97(0.58)
*
White
-0.69(0.75)
Employed
-0.55(0.64)
Married or Cohabitating
0.44(0.67)
Metro
-0.42(1.23)
Age
0.02(0.02)
Male
-0.05(0.55)
Education
-1.01(0.36) **
Income
-0.18(0.08) **
Constant
7.17(2.59)
**
*, ** significant at p=0.1 and 0.05 respectively

Magnitude of
Damage
R2 =0.0581
Parameter
(Std. Err.)
0.08(0.07)
0.06(0.07)
0.42(0.05)
**
0.21(0.25)
0.26(0.20)
-0.01(0.01) **
-0.28(0.20)
-0.02(0.26)
-0.04(0.22)
0.11(0.23)
0.51(0.43)
-0.01(0.01)
-0.31(0.19)
-0.32(0.12) **
-0.07(0.03) **
3.20(0.90)
**

Expected
Damage
R2=0.3869
Parameter
(Std. Err.)
0.08(0.16)
-0.07(0.18)
0.39(0.01)
1.38(0.62)
-0.18(0.49)
-0.01(0.01)
-0.47(0.50)
-0.96(0.65)
-0.39(0.55)
0.83(0.57)
1.09(1.06)
0.03(0.02)
-0.37(0.47)
-0.71(0.31)
-0.20(0.07)
3.04(2.22)

**
**

**
**

Table 30 shows the SUR estimation results of the frequency, magnitude, and
expected damage risk perception models with variance perceived risk. The variance
perceived risk and income variables are statistically significant across models. Like
previous results, when risk ambiguity increases one’s perceived risk also increases, and
increased income level decreases one’s perceived risk. The flood zone and state variables
are significant in the perceived risk from hurricane frequency model; the distance and
education variables are significant in the perceived risk from magnitude of damage
model; the flood zone and marital status variable are significant in the perceived risk
from expected damage model.
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Table 30

SUR Estimates of Mean Perceived Risks with Variance Risk Ambiguity

Dependent Variable

Hurricane
Frequency
R2=0.3747
Parameter
(Std. Err.)
-0.19(0.22)
-0.14(0.24)
0.04(0.001) **

Magnitude of
Damage
R2=0.0556
Parameter
(Std. Err.)
0.08(0.07)
0.06(0.07)
0.12(0.01) **

(N=446)
Risk Aversion (gain)
Risk Aversion (loss)
Variance of Risk
Ambiguity
Flood Zone(SFHA)
1.44(0.85) *
0.26(0.25)
Previous Damage
-0.20(0.66)
0.22(0.20)
Distance from the Coast
0.02(0.02)
-0.01(0.01) **
Florida State
-1.11(0.67) *
-0.27(0.20)
White
0.11(0.87)
0.07(0.26)
Employed
-0.38(0.74)
-0.0004(0.22)
Married or Cohabitating
0.49(0.78)
0.12(0.23)
Metro
0.18(1.44)
0.53(0.43)
Age
0.005(0.03)
-0.01(0.01)
Male
0.12(0.64)
-0.31(0.19)
Education
-0.64(0.41)
-0.27(0.12) **
Income
-0.16(0.09) *
-0.06(0.03) **
Constant
9.01(3.02) **
3.80(0.90) **
*, ** significant at p=0.1 and 0.05 respectively

Expected
Damage
R2=0.2655
Parameter
(Std. Err.)
-0.01(0.18)
0.08(0.20)
8.42(0.34) **
1.74(0.68)
-0.11(0.53)
0.01(0.01)
-0.59(0.54)
-0.32(0.70)
-0.30(0.60)
1.33(0.63)
1.52(1.16)
0.01(0.02)
-0.48(0.51)
-0.44(0.33)
-0.19(0.08)
-4.05(2.43)

**

**

**
*

Results for Maximum Likelihood Estimation Using Instrumental Variable (IV) for
NFIP Participation Model
In this part, the estimation results of the NFIP participation model are reported.
As mentioned before, the perceived risk model and the NFIP participation model are
estimated simultaneously. Since we assume that there is an endogeneity problem in the
NFIP participation model, a two-stage probit with IV estimation is used. In order to check
the validity of our assumption and of using a probit with IV estimation, we utilized two
different tests. The first test is Newy’s Over-ID test to check the validity of the
instruments in the probit with IV estimation. The second test is the Wald test of
exogeneity which checks the endogeneity in the estimation based on the assumption of
valid instruments. Therefore, prior to testing the endogeneity problem of a model, the
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validity of instruments needs to be confirmed first. Newy’s Over-ID test provides the
overidentificaiton statistics of the probit with IV. Lee (1992) proved Newy’s minimum
distance for estimators in a probit with IV model to test the overidentifying restriction.
The null hypothesis of an Over-ID test is that the excluded instruments are valid
instruments. In other words, it tests the lack of correlation of the error term and excluded
instruments. The rejection of the null means the invalidity of instruments, and thus, a
problem of validity exists in using the instrumented variables if the test statistic is
significant.
Next, the Wald test of exogeneity checks whether there is an endogeneity problem
or not. The null hypothesis of the Wald test of exogeneity is H 0 : λ  0 ; which means
there is exogeneity. If λ  0, the interaction term, ̂i λ , is gone. This means that there is
no term related to the error term in the estimation, so there is also no possibility of
endogeneity. Therefore, if the test statistic is not significant, there is no endogeneity
problem and using the instrumental variables are not appropriate. Consequently, an
insignificant Newey’s Over-ID test statistic confirms the validity of the instruments, and
a significant Wald test statistic announces that there is an endogeneity problem in the
model. In the bottom of each result table, the test statistics of Newy’s Over-ID test and
Wald test of exogeneity are reported.
To facilitate a comparison, each table includes the results of the six different
models: probit with IV estimation, simple probit estimation, seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR) estimation when risk ambiguity is measured as range and variance
separately. Since the dependent variable is a binary variable (whether purchase flood
insurance or not), OLS estimation from seemingly unrelated regression is not appropriate
method. Moreover, if there is endogeneity, probit estimation is also not appropriate.
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However, all estimation results are reported here for reference purpose, but due to the
different derivation for estimated parameters, the direct comparison of estimates are not
allowed among probit with IV, probit, and SUR estimations.
In the results table, the number of observation, log likelihoods of probit
estimations,  2 s of Likelihood Ratio for probit estimations,  2 s of the Wald test for
the coefficients of probit with IV estimations, estimated parameters, standard errors,
significant levels, test statistics for instruments’ validity (Newey’s Over-ID test), and
test statistics for endogeneity (the Wald test of exogeneity) are described.
Table 31 shows the results of the NFIP participation models when risk perception
is elicited by hurricane frequency. Through the Newy’s Over-ID test statistic and the
Wald test of exogeneity statistic at the bottom, using the probit with IV estimation to fix
the endogeneity problem seems appropriate in both NFIP participation model with range
perceived risk and NFIP participation model with variance perceived risk; the over-ID
test statistics are not significant, and the Wald test of exogeneity statistics are significant.
The results of the probit with IV estimation are not very interesting because there are
only one significant variable. In the probit with IV model using range perceived risk, the
estimated parameter of income variable is only statistically significant, and in the probit
with IV model using variance perceived risk, all estimated parameters are not significant.
About this result, we can explain it in two ways; either risk perception as elicited by
hurricane frequency does not explain an individual’s flood insurance purchasing behavior
or no significant relationship exists between the hypothesized variables and an
individual’s decision-making on flood insurance purchasing.
The results of both probit estimations show that the flood zone, risk aversion for
loss scenario, confidence in insurance company compensation, expectation for
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government aid, and income variables are significant. The values of the estimated
parameters are very close. It seems that using a different specification of risk ambiguity
did not affect the estimation for the NFIP participation model. However, since the Wald
test of exogeneity confirms that there is endogeneity, this similarity probably stems from
the endogeneity problem.
The results of seemingly unrelated regression have many similarities with probit
results. The flood zone, risk aversion for loss scenario, confidence in insurance company
compensation, expectation for government aid, and income variables are significant.
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Wald test of Exogeneity 
(2)

Wald

 2 (17)
2
Over-ID test  (3)

2

LR  (17)

2

6.87
0.583
30.00**

4.574
18.45**

0.02(0.01)
-0.002(0.05)
0.11(0.05)*
-0.02(0.05)
1.39(0.20)**
0.17(0.14)
0.02(0.15)
-0.01(0.004)
0.06(0.21)
0.22(0.16)
0.11(0.06)*
0.21(0.06)**
0.004(0.01)
0.08(0.14)
0.11(0.09)
0.06(0.02)**
-3.45(0.80)**
-242.5890
98.18**

0.07(0.80)
-0.10(0.22)
0.17(0.13)
-0.13(0.14)
2.378(2.56)
0.40(0.40)
0.30(1.09)
0.003(0.01)
-0.29(0.63)
0.08(0.51)
-0.24(0.26)
0.53(0.33)
-0.01(0.02)
-0.26(0.85)
0.45(0.50)
0.19(0.09)**
-2.54(3.37)

SUR
Probit with IV
Parameter (Std. Err.)
-0.003(0.003)
-0.20(0.11)
0.01(0.004)
-0.21(1.04)
-0.002(0.02)
-0.16(0.38)
0.03(0.02)*
0.24(0.27)
-0.01(0.01)
-0.24(0.31)
0.47(0.06)**
4.23(3.90)
0.05(0.04)
0.31(0.70)
0.004(0.05)
0.36(1.81)
-0.002(0.001)
-0.004(0.03)
0.01(0.06)
-0.10(1.27)
0.07(0.05)
-0.01(0.92)
0.03(0.02)*
-0.67(0.71)
0.06(0.02)**
1.03(0.76)
0.001(0.002)
0.01(0.03)
0.02(0.04)
-0.98(1.42)
0.04(0.03)
0.29(0.60)
0.02(0.01)**
0.29(0.21)
-0.46(0.23)**
-2.63(6.03)

22.47

-0.004(0.011)

Probit

-0.36(0.31)

Probit with IV
-0.001(0.004)
0.01(0.01)
-0.002(0.05)
0.10(0.05)*
-0.02(0.05)
1.39(0.18)**
0.17(0.14)
0.02(0.15)
-0.01(0.004)
0.06(0.21)
0.22(0.16)
0.11(0.06)*
0.20(0.06)**
0.004(0.01)
0.08(0.14)
0.11(0.09)
0.06(0.02)**
-3.46(0.80)**
-242.6534
98.05

Probit

-0.0001(0.000)
0.01(0.003)
-0.002(0.01)
0.03(0.02)*
-0.01(0.01)
0.47(0.06)**
0.05(0.04)
0.004(0.05)
-0.002(0.001)
0.01(0.06)
0.07(0.05)
0.03(0.02)*
0.06(0.02)**
0.001(0.002)
0.02(0.04)
0.03(0.03)
0.02(0.01)**
-0.50(0.23)**

SUR

Estimated Parameters of Probit with IV, Probit, SUR Models When Risk Perception Elicited by Hurricane Frequency

Dep. Var.: Ins. Purchase
Variables (N=446)
Range of Frequency
Variance of Frequency
Mean Frequency
Risk Aversion (gain)
Risk Aversion (loss)
CRS
Flood Zone(SFHA)
Previous Damage
PreFIRM
Distance from Coast
Detached Single House
Having a Mortgage
Insurance Confidence
Expected Gov. Aid
Age
Male
Education
Income
Constant
Log Likelihood

Table 31
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Table 32 shows the results NFIP participation models when risk perception is
elicited by magnitude of damage to the home. From insignificant Newy’s Over-ID test
statistic and significant Wald test of exogeneity test statistic, it is confirmed that the used
instruments in the probit with IV models are valid, and an endogineity problem exists in
the NFIP participation models. Comparing with Table 31, the results of probit with IV
model are very distinct. When risk ambiguity is measured as a range of perceived risk,
range of magnitude of damage, mean magnitude, flood zone, detached single house,
having a mortgage, education, and income variables are significant. The risk ambiguity
variance of magnitude of damage, flood zone, and income level are significant when risk
ambiguity is measure as a variance of perceived risk. The risk ambiguity, income, and
education variables are significant in common. When a person has less risk ambiguity or
has more perceived risk, the probability to flood insurance purchase increases. A person
has a property in a SFHA or has a house detached from other houses, or has a mortgage,
he has more probability to purchase flood insurance. With a higher income or a higher
education level, one’s probability of purchasing insurance increases. It is hard to decide
for which is a better estimation, but when a model include a different risk ambiguity
variable the result of two probit with IV models are different. In other words, the change
in risk ambiguity measurements affects the estimation of the NFIP participation model.
The results of the probit estimations are very similar with the previous results.
The mean magnitude, risk aversion for loss scenario, flood zone, having a mortgage,
insurance compensation, expected government aid, education, and income variables show
significant in both probit models.
The results of seemingly unrelated regression have significant mean magnitude,
flood zone, having a mortgage, insurance compensation, expected government aid, and
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income variables in both models, and range of magnitude of damage and education
variables are only significant in the NFIP participation model with range perceived risk
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2

(2)

Wald test of Exogeneity

Wald

 2 (17)
2
Over-ID test  (3)

2

LR  (17)

18.84**

21.92**

2.447

4.761

0.16(0.04)**
-0.02(0.05)
0.10(0.06)*
0.01(0.05)
1.46(0.20)**
0.11(0.14)
0.07(0.15)
-0.004(0.004)
0.21(0.22)
0.30(0.16)*
0.11(0.06)*
0.21(0.06)**
0.01(0.01)
0.09(0.14)
0.17(0.10)*
0.07(0.02)**
-4.53(0.86)**
-233.1785
117.00**

1.12(0.60)*
-0.01(0.13)
0.03(0.13)
0.18(0.14)
1.22(0.46)**
-0.75(0.54)
0.05(0.34)
0.01(0.01)
1.31(0.76)*
0.80(0.44)*
0.03(0.16)
0.05(0.16)
0.02(0.02)
0.48(0.36)
0.82(0.38)**
0.13(0.06)**
-7.97(3.87)**

17.09

-0.04(0.03)

-1.22(0.62)**

Probit with IV
Parameter (Std. Err.)
-0.02(0.01)*
-3.48(2.08)*
0.05(0.01)**
1.39(0.86)
-0.01(0.02)
0.01(0.17)
0.03(0.02)
0.003(0.17)
0.002(0.01)
0.22(0.20)
0.47(0.06)**
1.00(0.64)
0.03(0.04)
-0.91(0.74)
0.01(0.04)
-0.05(0.45)
-0.001(0.001)
0.01(0.02)
0.05(0.06)
1.44(1.01)
0.09(0.05)*
1.01(0.63)
0.03(0.02)*
0.004(0.22)
0.06(0.02)**
0.05(0.21)
0.002(0.002)
0.03(0.02)
0.03(0.04)
0.52(0.48)
0.05(0.02)*
0.88(0.45)*
0.02(0.01)**
0.13(0.07)*
-0.79(0.23)**
-11.52(5.75)**

SUR

26.81*

Probit

Probit with IV
-0.04 (0.06)
0.16(0.04)**
-0.02(0.05)
0.09(0.06)*
0.005(0.05)
1.46(0.20)**
0.13(0.14)
0.07(0.15)
-0.004(0.004)
0.20(0.22)
0.29(0.16)*
0.12(0.06)*
0.21(0.06)**
0.01(0.01)
-0.08(0.14)
0.16(0.050)*
0.07(0.02)**
-4.55(0.86)**
-233.7620
115.83**

Probit

-0.003(0.003)
0.05(0.01)**
-0.01(0.02)
0.03(0.02)
0.001(0.01)
0.47(0.06)**
0.04(0.04)
0.01(0.04)
-0.001(0.001)
0.05(0.06)
0.08(0.05)*
0.04(0.02)**
0.06(0.02)**
0.002(0.002)
0.03(0.04)
0.04(0.03)
0.02(0.01)**
-0.81(0.23)**

SUR

Estimated Parameters of Probit with IV, Probit, SUR Models When Risk Perception Elicited by Magnitude of
Damage

Dep. Var.: Ins. Purchase
Variables (N=446)
Range of Magnitude
Variance of Magnitude
Mean Magnitude
Risk Aversion (gain)
Risk Aversion (loss)
CRS
Flood Zone(SFHA)
Previous Damage
PreFIRM
Distance from Coast
Detached Single House
Having a Mortgage
Insurance Confidence
Expected Gov. Aid
Age
Male
Education
Income
Constant
Log Likelihood

Table 32
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Table 33 shows the results of NFIP participation models when risk perception is
elicited by expected damage. Because the Over-ID test statistics are significant, one
cannot be sure the validity of the instruments in both probit with IV models. The validity
of the Wald test of exogeneity is also doubtful because the Wald test of exogeneity is
conducted based on the assumption of valid instruments. In sum, the estimated
parameters are considered inaccurate because the selection of the estimation method is
not credible. In order to find a valid model, we manipulated the instrumental variables in
several ways, but the trials were failed.
If there was no endogeneity, using a simple probit estimation would be a more
accurate estimation method. Therefore, when risk perception is elicited by expected
damage, the simple probit results are more useful to interpret the behavior of flood
insurance purchase. The significant LR  2 statistics report that their estimate parameters
are not simultaneously zero in both probit models. The mean expected damage, risk
aversion for loss scenario, flood zone, insurance confidence, expected government aid,
and income variables have significant values in both. When one’s perceive risk increases,
the probability to purchase insurance also increases. When a property is located in a
SFHA, the property owner’s probability to purchase flood insurance increases. As the
confidence for an insurance company’s compensation increases or the expectation of
government aid increases, one’s probability to purchase flood insurance increases. Also,
with increased income the probability of purchasing flood insurance increases. Insurance
confidence and expected gov. aid variables are statistically significant only in this
models. There is evidence that the probit method provides an appropriate estimation
when the risk perception is elicited as expected damage. Nevertheless, the list of
significant variables is very similar with those of previous models.
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Wald test of Exogeneity 
(2)

Wald

 2 (17)
2
Over-ID test  (3)

2

LR  (17)

2

24.735**
3.08

7.00**

-0.02(0.25)
0.02(0.07)
0.07(0.08)
-0.07(0.10)
1.70(0.78)**
0.26(0.23)
0.08(0.31)
-0.01(0.01)
-0.05(0.38)
0.22(0.21)
-0.02(0.14)
0.28(0.13)**
0.01(0.01)
-0.07(0.34)
0.18(0.14)
0.08(0.03)**
-3.03(1.79)*

16.873**

0.01(0.004)**
-0.004(0.02)
0.03(0.02)*
-0.004(0.01)
0.45(0.06)**
0.05(0.04)
0.002(0.05)
-0.002(0.001)
0.01(0.06)
0.07(0.05)
0.03(0.02)*
0.06(0.02)**
0.001(0.002)
0.03(0.04)
0.03(0.03)
0.02(0.01)**
-0.53(0.23)**

50.48**

0.03(0.01)**
-0.01(0.05)
0.11(0.06)*
-0.01(0.05)
1.37(0.20)**
0.15(0.14)
0.01(0.15)
-0.01(0.004)
0.11(0.21)
0.22(0.16)
0.12(0.06)*
0.21(0.06)**
0.01(0.01)
0.09(0.14)
0.12(0.09)
0.07(0.02)**
-3.70(0.81)**
-239.8941
103.57**

0.30(0.38)
-0.03(0.08)
0.11(0.09)
-0.001(0.12)
1.05(1.01)
0.19(0.26)
-0.56(0.37)
-0.004(0.01)
0.10(0.44)
0.20(0.24)
-0.001(0.15)
0.21(0.16)
-0.004(0.01)
0.22(0.43)
0.36(0.21)*
0.11(0.04)**
-4.15(2.18)*

0.03(0.01)**
-0.01(0.05)
0.11(0.06)*
-0.01(0.05)
1.37(0.20)**
0.15(0.14)
0.01(0.15)
-0.01(0.004)
0.11(0.21)
0.22(0.16)
0.12(0.06)*
0.21(0.06)**
0.01(0.01)
0.09(0.14)
0.12(0.09)
0.07(0.02)**
-3.71(0.81)**
-239.8441
103.67**

0.05(0.15)

Probit with IV

Parameter (Std. Err.)
-0.001(0.002)
-1.32(1.14)

SUR

43.54**

0.001(0.01)

Probit

-0.12(0.07)*

Probit with IV

-0.02(0.04)

SUR

0.01(0.004)**
-0.004(0.02)
0.03(0.02)*
-0.004(0.01)
0.45(0.06)**
0.05(0.04)
0.001(0.05)
-0.002(0.001)
0.01(0.06)
0.07(0.05)
0.03(0.02)*
0.06(0.02)**
0.001(0.002)
0.03(0.04)
0.03(0.03)
0.02(0.01)**
-0.53(0.23)**

Probit

Estimated Parameters of Probit with IV, Probit, SUR Models When Risk Perception Elicited by Expected Damage

Dep. Var.:Insurance
Purchase
Variables (N=446)
Range of Expected Damage
Variance of Expected
Damage
Mean Magnitude
Risk Aversion (gain)
Risk Aversion (loss)
CRS
Flood Zone(SFHA)
Previous Damage
PreFIRM
Distance from Coast
Detached Single House
Having a Mortgage
Insurance Confidence
Expected Gov. Aid
Age
Male
Education
Income
Constant
Log Likelihood

Table 33

86

For an economic aspect, the estimated parameters from a probit estimation
including a probit with IV estimation do not have any economic meanings by themselves.
Due to the unavailability of the direct interpretation of probit estimates, marginal effects
(MEs) are additionally calculated in Table 34, 35, and 36. In STATA, there is an option
to calculate marginal effects, but in the case of using a two-stage probit with IV
estimator, it is not provided. Thus the marginal effects are calculated by hand based on
the same formula of the STATA. The calculation for marginal effects is shown below.
When θ̂ is the vector of parameter estimates, marginal effect, p(θ) , is estimated
using

p̂ 
N

where

.    j (S p ) j
j1

1 N
ˆ
  (S ) f (z j ,θ)
. j1 j p j

(34)

.

 j ( S p ) shows whether observation j is in subpopulation S p ,  j is the weight for the j
th observation, and N is the sample size (Stata, 2009).
These following tables report the marginal effect (ME) of probit with IV, probit,
and estimates of SUR. ME shows the probability change of NFIP participation according
to a unit change of variables. For NFIP participation models using perceived risk from
hurricane frequency and magnitude of damage, probit with IV is an appropriate method
while for models using perceived risk from expected damage, probit is a proper method.
Therefore, meaningful interpretation of ME is only from the valid models and their
significant variables. In ME tables, additional information is included for reference, like
estimation result tables. Table 34 notes the MEs of NFIP participation models when risk
perception elicited by hurricane frequency. From probit with IV models, only income
variable of the NFIP participation with range of perceived risk model is statistically
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significant and has a valuable interpretation. When one category of the income variable
increases, the probability of flood insurance purchasing increases by 6.4%.
Table 34

Marginal Effects of Probit with IV and Probit Models and Estimates of SUR
Model When Risk Perception Elicited by Hurricane Frequency

Dependent Variable:
Insurance Purchasing

Probit
with IV

Probit

Range of Hurricane
Frequency
Variance of Hurricane
Frequency
Mean Hurricane Frequency
Risk Aversion (gain)
Risk Aversion (loss)
CRS
Flood Zone(SFHA)
Previous Damage
PreFIRM
Distance from Coast
Detached Single House
Having a Mortgage
Insurance Confidence
Expected Gov. Aid
Age
Male
Education
Income

-0.121

-0.001

(N=446)

SUR

Probit
with IV
Marginal Effect
-0.003

Probit

SUR

-0.074 -0.0002 -0.0001
0.024
-0.032
0.059
-0.042
0.734
0.150
0.109
0.001
-0.108
0.029
-0.079
0.177
-0.002
-0.093
0.152
0.064

0.005
-0.001
0.032
-0.007
0.426
0.052
0.007
-0.002
0.018
0.066
0.033
0.063
0.001
0.023
0.035
0.019

0.006
-0.002
0.030
-0.007
0.464
0.053
0.004
-0.002
0.007
0.066
0.030
0.060
0.001
0.023
0.036
0.018

-0.077
-0.057
0.086
-0.084
0.854
0.118
0.135
-0.002
-0.036
-0.002
-0.241
0.372
0.003
-0.350
0.104
0.103

0.004 0.005
-0.001 -0.002
0.032 0.029
-0.07 -0.007
0.427 0.466
0.051 0.051
0.007 0.004
-0.002 -0.002
0.019 0.008
0.066 0.066
0.034 0.030
0.063 0.059
0.001 0.001
0.023 0.022
0.034 0.033
0.019 0.018

Table 35 reports the MEs of the NFIP participation models when risk perception
is elicited by magnitude of damage. Only MEs of probit with IV models are explicitly
explained in this section. With a level higher education variable, an individual has 63.3 %
increased probability to purchase flood insurance in the NFIP participation model with
range of perceived risk and 29.2% increased probability in the NFIP participation model
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with variance perceived risk. Moreover, when one unit of risk ambiguity increases, the
probability of insurance purchasing decreases by 94.8 % in the NFIP participation model
with range of perceived risk and decreases by 115 % in the NFIP participation model
with variance perceived risk. These huge MEs are caused by a small value of perceived
risk from magnitude of damage, and thus one unit change of range/variance of perceived
risk is huge change in this model. When a property is located in a high flood risk area
(SFHA), the property owner has 25.2 % higher probability of insurance purchasing in the
NFIP participation model with range of perceived risk. In the NFIP participation model
with range of perceived risk, if a unit of mean risk perception increases, the probability to
purchasing insurance increases by 86.7 %; if the house type is a detached single family
house, the home owner has 47 % increased probability for insurance purchasing; if a
property owner currently holds outstanding mortgage principal, he has 25.9 % more
probability to purchase flood insurance. When one category of the income variable
increases, the probability of insurance purchasing increases by 10.2 % in t the NFIP
participation model with range perceived risk, and 4.4 % in the NFIP participation model
with variance perceived risk. Considering that the interval of income category is about
$2,500 to $25,000, the increased probability is small.
Other MEs also can be interpreted in the same way, but we only emphasize and
interpret the MEs for significant variables from the valid model.

89

Table 35

Marginal Effects of Probit with IV and Probit Models and Estimates of SUR
Model When Risk Perception Elicited by Magnitude of Damage

Dependent Variable:
Probit
Insurance Purchasing
with IV
(N 446)
Range of Magnitude of
-0.948
Damage
Variance of Magnitude of
Damage
Mean Magnitude of
0.867
Damage
Risk Aversion (gain)
-0.011
Risk Aversion (loss)
0.026
CRS
0.135
Flood Zone(SFHA)
0.252
Previous Damage
-0.238
PreFIRM
0.098
Distance from Coast
0.009
Detached Single House
0.470
Having a Mortgage
0.259
Insurance Confidence
0.019
Expected Gov. Aid
0.380
Age
0.016
Male
0.141
Education
0.633
Income
0.102

Probit
-0.012

SUR

Probit
with IV
Marginal Effect
-0.018

Probit

SUR

-1.151

-0.012

-0.003

0.049

0.054

0.459

0.047

0.051

-0.005
0.028
0.002
0.431
0.033
0.020
-0.001
0.062
0.089
0.033
0.062
0.002
0.025
0.049
0.021

-0.008
0.026
0.002
0.471
0.031
0.014
-0.001
0.050
0.086
0.034
0.059
0.002
0.033
0.048
0.019

0.002
0.001
0.071
0.381
-0.303
-0.019
0.005
0.363
0.329
0.001
0.017
0.010
0.190
0.292
0.044

-0.006
0.028
0.001
0.432
0.037
0.020
-0.001
0.059
0.087
0.034
0.063
0.002
0.023
0.046
0.021

-0.008
0.026
0.001
0.471
0.036
0.015
-0.001
0.045
0.085
0.035
0.060
0.002
0.031
0.044
0.019

Table 36 describes the MEs when risk perception is elicited by expected damage.
For the case risk perception is elicited by expected damage, MEs of the probit is worthy
to interpret. A unit increase of mean expected damage increases the probability of
insurance purchase by 1% in both NFIP participation models. A unit increase in risk
aversion of loss scenario increases 3.2% of insurance purchasing probability in both
models. That means a risk-averse person has a higher probability of insurance purchase.
When a property located in a SFHA, the property owner has 41.6% higher probability of
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flood insurance purchase in both. Whether a property is located in a SFHA leads a huge
change of probability of insurance purchase compared to other variables. A unit increase
of confidence for an insurance company’s compensation and of expectation for
government aid increase the probability of insurance purchase 3.5% and 6.4%,
respectively, in the NFIP participation model with range perceived risk and 3.6% and
6.4% in the NFIP participation model with variance perceived risk. Moreover, an unit
increase in the income variable increases the probability of flood insurance purchasing by
2% equally in both models. The MEs of both probit models are very close. It is possible
to explain that there is not significant impact of using different methods of risk ambiguity
in a probit estimation. However, to confirm this assumption, further research is required
to exam details. Estimates of SUR have similar values of estimates with MEs of probit
models even though they are derived differently.
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Table 36

Marginal Effects of Probit with IV and Probit Models and Estimates of SUR
Model when Risk Perception Elicited by Expected Damage

Dependent Variable:
Insurance Purchasing
(N 446)
Range of Expected
Damage
Variance of Expected
Damage
Mean Expected
Damage
Risk Aversion (gain)
Risk Aversion (loss)
CRS
Flood Zone(SFHA)
Previous Damage
PreFIRM
Distance from Coast
Detached Single House
Having a Mortgage
Insurance Confidence
Expected Gov. Aid
Age
Male
Education
Income

Probit
with IV

Probit

-0.042

0.0002

SUR

Probit
with IV
Marginal Effect
-0.001

Probit

SUR

-0.456

0.016

-0.022

0.104

0.010

0.010

-0.007

0.010

0.010

-0.009
0.038
-0.0003
0.399
0.073
-0.021
-0.001
0.036
0.074
-0.002
0.070
-0.001
0.081
0.122
0.039

-0.002
0.032
-0.004
0.416
0.046
0.003
-0.002
0.033
0.066
0.035
0.064
0.001
0.026
0.036
0.020

-0.004
0.030
-0.004
0.453
0.047
0.002
-0.002
0.014
0.067
0.032
0.057
0.001
0.029
0.034
0.018

0.007
0.023
-0.024
0.599
0.095
0.030
-0.002
-0.018
0.079
-0.005
0.097
0.002
-0.027
0.062
0.028

-0.002
0.032
-0.004
0.416
0.046
0.003
-0.002
0.034
0.065
0.036
0.064
0.001
0.027
0.035
0.020

-0.004
0.030
-0.004
0.453
0.047
0.001
-0.002
0.014
0.067
0.032
0.057
0.001
0.029
0.033
0.018
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This research was conducted to identify the factors that influence subjective risk
perceptions, particularly risk ambiguity, regarding hurricane frequency and property
damage, and how these subjective perceptions influence NFIP participation. The data
were collected via online survey from a sample of coastal residents in Alabama, Florida,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.
The main contribution of this research is that this is the first study which collected
range/variance of perceived flood risk of hurricane strike and property damage.
Range/variance of perceived risk is interpreted as a measure of one’s risk ambiguity.
We also collect data on perceived confidence in insurance companies to pay the
full amount of claims and to test if and to what degree this factor affects NFIP
participation. Additionally, we introduced new demographic indicators in the mean and
range/variance of perceived risk models such as metropolitan living status, working
status, marital status, ethnicity, and state. These demographic characteristics were not
accounted for flood risk in previous research. Marital status, ethnicity, and state show
significance in some models.
Key findings are as follows. The mandatory purchase requirement seems to
operate well. We find that among sample respondents who live in a SFHA, 76% hold a
flood policy. Furthermore, we find that in our sample, participation rate of mortgage
holders in a SFHA is 90% of total mortgage holders in a SFHA purchased flood
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insurance. Enhancement of implementation of mandatory purchase requirement for flood
insurance would increase NFIP participation, but with an already high participation rate,
achieving yet higher via additional regulations may prove difficult. Therefore, it is better
to find a feasible way to increase NFIP participation through other regulations sources,
for example, a stronger regulation for new constructions in coastal areas.
Regarding the role of risk factors on the decision to purchase flood insurance,
mean perceived risk, range/variance of perceived risk, and risk aversion are statistically
significant in some NFIP participation models. Even though they are not consistently
significant across all models, they provide some evidence that these factors influence
one’s decision to purchase flood insurance. For future studies of NFIP participation, it is
recommended that researchers account for these risk factors.
When risk perception is elicited as expected damage to the homes in a given year,
the confidence in insurance companies and expectation of government aid are significant.
As one’s confidence for compensation from an insurance company increases, the
probability of flood insurance purchase increases. Thus, efforts to increase confidence in
insurance companies will help encourage people to buy flood insurance. On the other
hand, we hypothesized that the expectation of government aid has a negative relationship
with NFIP participation, but with high expectation the probability of insurance purchase
also increases. Since NFIP is a government program, the increase of confidence for
government would result in the increase of NFIP participation. Also, it is expected from
positively related expectation for government aid that the intention of confidence for
payable ability of government would help NFIP implementation.
The follow is a discussion of potential direction for future research. The
comparison of NFIP models’ results when perceived risk is elicited as hurricane
94

frequency, magnitude of damage, and expected damage confirmed that the change of
variable specifications leads to differences in explanatory power of related variables. For
example, in the NFIP participation model when risk is perceived as hurricane frequency,
one’s decision to purchase flood insurance was significantly related to the state where he
resides, while this relationship was not significant in the NFIP participation model when
risk perceived as magnitude of damage. Therefore, a researcher should carefully select
his risk perception measurement carefully depending on his objective.
Due to some misunderstandings over survey questions, many observations were
dropped, and thus, the applicable observation number for statistical analysis was limited
although many people participated in the survey. It is possible that our risk perception
queries were misunderstood by respondents. Many significant variables existed in NFIP
models when risk perception is elicited as magnitude of damage while a few
hypothesized variables were statistically significant in other NFIP models. This result
may results from that measurement of particular perceived risk is poor. Therefore,
development of precise questions related to risk perception will improve the data quality
for further research.
NFIP participation models when risk perception is elicited as expected damage
did not have endogeneity although measurement of perceived expected damage was
derived from the measurement of other two perceived risks. It could be a problem of the
estimation specification or a problem of the risk perception measurement. In order to find
a precise reason of this result, additional research is recommended.
Research regarding one’s attitude toward flood risk was rarely conducted, and risk
attitude is not an easily measurable characteristic. In spite of some caveats, this research
provides more understanding for an individual’s attitude related to flood risk to
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policymakers. Since risk attitude affects one’s decision for NFIP participation,
policymakers may wish to find to better understand and account for attitudes regarding
risk in order to improve the quality of the National Flood Insurance Program and to
encourage NFIP participation. However, developing practical means of collecting reliable
information on subjective risk information may prove difficult.

96

REFERENCES
Arrow, J.K. 1971. Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. Chicago: Markham Publishing
Company.
Basmann, R.L. 1960. “On Finite Sample Distributions of Generalized Classical Linear
Identifiability Test Statistics.” Journal of the American Statistical Association
55:650-659.
Baumann, D.D. and J.H. Sims. 1978. “Flood Insurance: Some Determinants of
Adoption.” Economics Geography 54(3):189-196.
Bin, O. and J.B. Kruse. 2006. “Real Estate Market Response to Coastal Flood Hazards.”
Natural Hazards Review 7(4):137-144.
Becker, W.S. and F.O. Brownson. 1964. “What Price ambiguity? Or the Role of
Ambiguity in Decision Making.” Journal of Political Economy 72:62-73.
Browne, J.M. and R.E. Hoyt. 2000. “The Demand for Flood Insurance: Empirical
Evidence.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 20:291-306.
Burby, R.J. 2001. “Flood insurance and floodplain management: the US experience.”
Environmental Hazard 3:111-122.
Burrus T.R., F.C. Dumas, E.J. Graham. 2008. “Costal Homeowner response to Hurricane
Risk Perceptions” Journal of Housing Research 17(1):49-60.
Cabantous, L. 2007. “Ambiguity Aversion in the Field of Insurance: Insurers’ Attitude to
Imprecise and Conflicting Probability Estimate.” Theory and Decision 62:219240.
Cameron A.T. 2005. “Updating Subjective Risks in the Presence of Conflicting
Information: An Application to Climate Change.” Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty 30:63-97.
Chavas, J. 2004. Risk Analysis in Theory and Practice. San Diego: Elsevier Academic
Press.
Dixon, L., N. Clancy, S.A. Seabury, and A. Overton. 2006. “The National Flood
Insurance Program’s Market Penetration Rate: Estimate and Policy Implications.”
American Institutes for Research.
97

Einhorn, J.H. and R.M. Hogarth. 1986. “Decision Making under Ambiguity.” Journal of
Business 59:225-250.
Ellsberg, D. 1961. “Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 75:643-69.
EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database. 2009. Natural Disaster
Trend Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels (Belgium) Internet URL:
http://www.emdat.be/natural- disasters-trends Accessed on Sep. 26, 2011.
Etner, J., M. Jeleva, and J. Tallon. 2010. “Decision Theory Under Ambiguity.” Journal of
Economic Surveys 25(4):1-45.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 2010. Answers to Questions About
the National Flood Insurance Program. Internet URL:
http://www.fema.gov/business/nfip Accessed on Mar. 24, 2011.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 2011. Total Policies in Force by
Calendar Year. Internet URL: http://www.nyspacastle.com/main/main.php
Accessed on Aug. 15, 2011.
Flood Damage in the United States. 2010. Flood Damage in the United States, 1926-2003
A Reanalysis of National Weather Service Estimates. Internet URL:
http://www.flooddamagedata.org/national.html Accessed on Nov. 10, 2010.
Greene, W.H. 2005. Econometric Analysis, 5th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice
Hall.
Greene, W.H. 2007. LIMDEP version 9.0 Econometric Modeling Guide volume 1. Plain
View, NY: Econometric Software, Inc.
Habb, C.T. and K.E. McConnell. 2003. Valuing Environmental and Natural Resources.
Northampton: Edward Elgar.
Hogarth, R.M. and H. Kunreuther. 1985. “Ambiguity and Insurance Decisions.”
American Economic Review 75:386-390.
Hogarth, R.M. and H. Kunreuther. 1989. “Risk, Ambiguity, and Insurance.” Journal of
Risk and Uncertainty 2:5-35.
Holt, C.A. and S.K. Laury. 2002. “Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects.” The American
Economic Review 92:1644-55.
Insurance Information Institution. 2011. Catastrophes: Insurance Issues. Internet URL:
http://www.iii.org/issues-updates/catastrophes-insurance-issues.html. Accessed on
Aug. 11, 2011.
98

Kellens W., R. Zaalberg, T. Neutens, W. Vanneuville, and D.P. Maeyer, 2011. “An
Analysis of the Public Perception of Flood Risk on the Belgian Coast.” Risk
Analysis 31(7):1055-1067.
Knight, H.F. 1971. Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press.
Kousky, R.J., F.P. Luttmer, and R.J. Zeckhauser. 2006. “Private Investment and
Governments Protection.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 33:73-100.
Kriesel, W. and C. Landry. 2004. “Participation in the National Flood Insurance
Program: An Empirical Analysis for Coastal Properties.” Journal of Risk and
Insurance 71:405-420.
Kunrenther, H. 1976. “Limited Knowledge and Insurance Protection.” Public Policy
24:227-261.
Kunreuther, H. 1978. Disaster insurance Protection: Public Policy Lessons. New York:
John Wiley.
Kunreuther, H., J. Meszaros, R.M. Hogarth, and M. Spranca. 1995. “Ambiguity and
Underwriter Decision Processes.” Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization 26:337-352.
Kunreuther, H. 1996. “Mitigating Disaster Losses through Insurance.” Journal of Risk
and Uncertainty 12:171-187.
Kunreuther, H. 2006. “Disaster Mitigation and Insurance: Learning from Katrina.” The
Annals of the American Academy 604:208-227.
Lachlan A.K., J. Burke, R.P. Spence, and D. Griffin, 2009. “Risk Perception, Race and
Hurricane Katrina.” The Howard Journal of Communications 20:295-309.
Landry, E.C. and M.R. Jahan-Parvar. 2010. “Flood Insurance Coverage in the Coastal
Zone.” Journal of Risk and Insurance 0:1-28.
Lauriola. M. and I.P. Levin. 2001. “Relating Individual Difference in Attitude toward
Ambiguity to Risky Choices.” Journal of Behavior Decision Making 14:107-122.
Miceli, R., I. Sotgiu, and M. Settanmi. 2008 “Disaster preparedness and perception of
flood risk: A study in an alpine valley in Italy.” Journal of Environmental
Psychology 28:164-173.
Michel-Kerjan, E.O. and C. Kousky. 2010. “Come Rain or Shine: Evidence on Flood
Insurance Purchases in Florida.” Journal of Risk and Insurance 77(2):369-397.

99

McClelland, G.H., W.D. Schulze, and D.L. Coursey. 1993. “Insurance for LowProbability Hazards: A Bimodal Response to Unlikely Events.” Journal of Risk
and Uncertainty 7:95-116.
McFadden, D. 1974. Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior. New
York: Frontiers in Econometrics.
NOAA/National Weather Service. Flood losses: Compilation of Flood Loss Statistics.
Internet URL:
http://www.nws.noaa.gov/hic/flood_stats/Flood_loss_time_series.shtml. Accessed
on Nov. 20, 2011.
NOAA/National Weather Service National Hurricane Center U.S. Hurricane Strikes.
Internet URL: http:// www.nhc.noaa.gov/climo. Accessed on Mar. 21, 2012
Newey, W.K. 1987. “Efficient Estimation of Limited Dependent Variable Models with
Endogenous Explanatory Variables.” Journal of Econometrics 36(3):231-250.
Nguyen, T.N., P.M. Jakus, M. Riddel, and W.D. Shaw. 2010. “An Empirical Model of
Perceived Mortality Risks for Selected U.S. Arsenic Hot Spots.” Risk Analysis
30:1550-1562.
Ogurtsov, A.V., M. Asseldonk, and R. Huirne. 2008. “Purchase of Catastrophe Insurance
by Dutch Dairy and Arable Farmers” Reviews of Agricultural Economics
31(1):143-162.
Petrolia, R.P., C.E. Landry, and H.C. Keith. 2011 “Using Subjective Risk and
Experimental Information to Predict Flood Insurance and Self-Protection
Measures” Unpublished paper presented at the 2011 AERE conference. Seattle,
WA.
Pinelli, J.P., E. Simiu, K. Gurley, C. Subramaniani, L. Zhang, A. Cope, J.J. Filliben, and
S. Hamid. 2004. “Hurricane Damage Prediction Model for Residential
Structures.” Journal of Structural Engineering 130:1685-1691.
Pynn, R., and G.M. Ljung. 1999. “Flood Insurance: A Survey of Grand Forks, North
Dakota, Homeowners.” Applied Behavioral Science Review 7(2):171-180.
Riddel, M. 2009. “Risk Perception, Ambiguity, and Nuclear-Waste Transport.” Southern
Economic Journal 75:781-797.
Sargan, J.D. 1958. “The Estimation of Economic Relationships Using Instrumental
Variables.” Econometrica 26:393-415.
STATA, 2009, STATA Base Reference Manual Release 11. Texas: STATA press.

100

Swiss Re. 2011. World Insurance in 2010. Internet URL:
http://media.swissre.com/documents/sigma2_2011_en.pdf. Accessed on Jun. 21,
2011.
Tobin, R.J. and C. Calfee. 2005. The National Flood Insurance Program’s Mandatory
Purchase Requirement: Policies, Processes, and Stakeholder. Internet URL:
http://www.fema.gov/nfip/nfipeval.shtm. Accessed on Dec. 27, 2010.
U.S. Census Bureau. 2011. “Population Distribution and Change: 2000 to 2010.” Internet
URL: http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf. Accessed on
Aug.16, 2011.
Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center. 2011. Who’s paying and
who’s benefiting most from flood insurance under the NFIP? Internet URL:
http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/WRCib2011b-nfip-who-pays.pdf.
Accessed on Jan.10, 2012.
Zahran, S., S. Weiler, S.D. Brody, M.K. Lindell, and W.E. Highfield. 2009. “Modeling
National Flood Insurance Policy Holding at the County Scale.” Ecological
Economics 68:2627-2636.

101

